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I- INTEODOCTION
Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed
forces, signed the article on "military strategy" in the
official Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Over the course of
ten pages cniy one shcrt paragragh is devoted to the subject
of "lccal war."
"Soviet military strategy also takes into account the
possibility of outbreak of local wars, the political
nature of which is determined on the basis of class
positions and the Leninist proposition concerning just
and unjust wars. In supporting wars of national libera-
tion, the Soviet Union resolutely opposes local wars
takin<
bu -
ger associated with the possibility of their devel-
unieasnea Dy tne imperialists, K ng into account notjust their reactionary essence, t also the grsat
dan
oping into a world war." 1
Though the content analysts may find the relative importance
of one paragraph among ten pages of material a telling lack
of emphasis on the subject of local war, this analysis will
concentrate on the fact that Ogarkov included the paragraph,
legitimizing local war as a part of Soviet Military Strategy
(certainly as a topic deserving consideration among ether
matters cf military strategy), and on his acknowledgement of
the risks of embarking en a course of local war.
The larger purpose of this thesis will be to generate a
regular method of putting a local war in context and using
this historically derived context to measure the risk
factors and expected benefits that might be weighed in a
Soviet decision to proceed or to withdraw. To the extent
that the ccntext we create is realistic and inclusive, a
tocl for predicting Soviet responses to U.S. escalation and
1 C.fief. Is p. 2-8] reprints this section of the article
offers the same argument for it's importance in context.

withdrawal will have been described. Finally, at a mcr^
practical level, the actual assets available to exercise
policy options will be quantified operationally so that the
parameters of the options available can be best understood.
I will begin with a general discussion of Sovist poli-
tical goals in the Third World and- the naval missions that
apply to their achievement. The ideological foundations for
the use of military force to support world wide revolution,
then the general character of past uses of naval power
projection in this context will be described. In order to
clarify the limits cf this analysis, a short list of the
naval power projection incidents that are appropriate to
this consideration will be offered.
An effort will then be made to explicate the most
significant previous efforts to create frameworks for under-
standing Soviet naval power projection incidents. The two
chosen are taken from the works of Michael MccGwire and
James McCcnnell, who have for the past decade stood as the
best known and most widely quoted experts in the field of
Soviet Navy studies.
Soviet cost-benefit (or risk-gain) factors will then be
worked out. The general categories used to break them out
for this study are political/ideological factors, economic
factors, and military factors. A series of conclusions will
te reached regarding the general trends observable in the
operations of the Soviet Navy during the course of the cases
examined. The stakes in a given intervention will be
detailed in their ideological, economic, and military dimen-
sions. And the nature of the decision points that appear
before and during will be described so that a short series
cf case studies can te followed through analytically with
the operational and cost-benefit principles applied.
Finally, operational definitions of the military tools
available to carry out policy will be developed in seme

detail, and trends established so that the "limits of inter-
vention" can be projected into the future at this level as
well, and projected onto the constraints developed in the
examinations of past policy.

II. POLITICAL GOALS AN£ NAVAL MISSIONS
The opening quotation from Marshal Ogarkov is mean-: to
introduce the idea that local wars beyond the Soviet perim-
eter are not excluded from the considerations of military
planners. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the
Soviet military interest in local wars by examining The uses
of military (especially naval) force. 2
A. IDEOIOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF POWER PROJECTION
The revolutionary cycle of Marx's "scientific theory of
history" takes place on a worldwide scale. There is abun-
dant evidence that the Soviet leadership has not renounced
the worldwide revolutionary process, and in fact continues
to consider itself the foundation of the world socialist
community. More specifically, Ogarkov is one among a
succession of Soviet military leaders who have been open in
their belief that the Red Army is the vanguard of the global
revolution. Marshal Grechko, then Soviet Minister of
Defense, put it this way [Ref. 3 ] in 1974:
"At the present stage the historic function of the
Soviet Armed Forces is net restricted merely to their
function in defending cur Motherland and the other
socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the
Soviet state actively and purposefully opposes the
expert of counter-revolution and the policy of oppres-
sion, supports the national liberation struggle, and
resolutely resists imperialist aggression in whatever
distant region of our planet it may appear appear." 3
2 The existence of a power projection mission for the
Soviet Navy remains somewhat controversial, but Norman
Folmar lists it as the primary new mission development of
the 1980s [Ref, 2: p. 37].
3 See also the analysis of Harriet Fast Scott and William
F. Scott in [Ref- U].
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This analysis concentrates on naval power projection in
local wars, because naval power is the most readily "protec-
table" in a wide variety of imaginable conflicts.
E. NAVAL POWEfi PROJECTION IN CONTEXT
Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov, the Commander in Chief of
the Soviet Navy since 1956, is not bashful in his presenta-
tion cf the role that the Navy plays in the worldwide anti-
imperialist process:
"The Soviet Navy is also used in foreign policy measures
by cur state. But the aims cf this use radically differ
from these of the imperialist powers. Ths Soviet Navy
tary adventurism and decisively countering threats to
the safety of the peoples from the imperialist powers."
[Hef. 5: p. 251]
Admiral Gorshkov, cf course, has a vested interest in
promoting the use of military force in support of the world
revolutionary struggle just because his forces are indeed
the most readily available for such an operation should it
te ordered. The institutional battle for resources ameng
the Soviet military services would likely find the Navy
representative promoting military intervention overseas
because it requires an investment in ships, which uniquely
enjoy the advantages of high mobility, endurance at high
levels of readiness, and independence of operations from the
consideratiens of violating national sovereignty or securing
overflight permission (Eef- 5: pp. 235-236].
The motivation sounds familiar enough to anyone who
reads the newspapers and is willing to mirror-image the
Soviet bureaucratic process relative to our own. That
process has merit, but one should avoid several pitfalls.
In the first place, Marxism/Leninism is so firmly imbedded
11

in the day to day functions of the Soviet state that
ideology must be taken seriously as a motivator for concrete
action in ways that have no analogy in American political or
government life. Secondly, all Soviet military missions
revolve around the central duty to defend the homeland. As
the vanguard communist state in the ideological sense, and
as a peocle many times burned by invaders in the historical
sense, no mission takes precedence over the survival of the
Soviet State. The Navy, then, must stake out territory
under the umbrella of the national defense rubric tc justify
its construction programs. The coastal defense forces that
dominated the Soviet Navy in the first half of the Twentieth
Century are examples of straightforward defensive forces
that must have been relatively easy to justify in the
context above. The move to larger, "blue water" forces
capable cf operating anywhere on the World Ocean is usually
explained in terms of the movement of strategic missiles to
sea in the 1960s, and the need to defend against U.S. subma-
rines or protect Soviet SSBNs.* Another way to justify the
construction of large surface units is to point to their
unique value in supporting critical Soviet national defense
goals abroad.
Gorshkov goes about this in several ways. An inter-
esting method, if ideologically unfamiliar to the western
mind, is tc simply redefine national defense to specifically
include the defense of the socialist community as a whole,
rather than simply the homeland of the Soviet State. It is
interesting to note that when one compares the first and
second editions of Gorshkov's own book, there are two
instances in the introduction alone where precisely this has
teen dene for the benefit of second edition readers.
This is considered in greater detail below. For the
seminal presentation of the "defensive" theory of Soviet
naval forces, see [Bef. 6] (especially chapters IX and X).
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Another well-triad method of making the case for a Soviet
weapon is to point tc the usefulness of analagous weapons in
the inventories of capitalist states or to even quote
American or British admirals describing the value of such
weapons. Several examples of this will be offered later
when seme Soviet weapons are discussed in detail. The
tactic that appears tc have been most effective for the
Soviet Navy, however, has been to justify the need for
"multipurpose" ships, which can effectively carry out a
variety cf homeland defense missions, such as anti-carrier
warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-air warfare, as
well as significant missions in support of Soviet allies or
clients in local wars. One can almost imagine a Soviet ship
program manager describing the utility of the components of
a weapons suite against the "aggressive NATO forces," then
laying en the frosting by pointing out that in peacetime the
unit will not be wasted because it can serve the defense
needs of the Socialist Community with the same weapons or
the threat to use them.
He wculd be making a legitimate point. As we will see
below, a large part of the function of naval forces is in
countering superpower involvement. The weapons designed to
protect the Northern Fleet operating areas from American
carriers are obviously just as well suited to keeping the
American forces away from the shores of the Soviet client
engaged in a local war, if the level of committment is
similar. The conventional wisdom countering this general
idea cf Soviet force employment is that these same forces
are needed at all times to react to American threats to the
home waters and would therefore not be available for use in
distant sea theatres. As we have noted, the homeland
defense irission supercedes all else, but the assumption that
all major naval forces will be turned to a relatively close
defensive alignment when the level of tension rises is
13

dependent upon relative force capabilities, credibility of
threats, and other considerations that will be discussed
below
.
C. DEFINING THE DATAEASE
Eefcre we proceed to the closer points of analysis,
there should be no confusion as to what is being considered
and what is not. The purpose of this study is to explore
Soviet capabilities for power projection in what the Soviets
call "local wars." Gcrshkov defines these as:
"...wars limited tc the participation of two or a few
states..
.
(which are) limited in their tasks, the terri-
tory cf operation and the scale and means employed in
the armed conflict." [Ref. 5: p. 234. ]
This is a handy definition because it carefully distin-
guishes local wars fiom strategic and theater conflicts for
which doctrine is stiflingly abundant. Although Ogarkov
notes that local wars want to escalate, they are not like
ether wars until they do, so there is latitude for seme
imaginative force planning to fight local wars and still
more incentive to create general purpose platforms that can
make the transition.
Tc focus the concern of this study still further, we
will liiit ourselves to those incidents of naval power
projection in the Third World which have been identified by
authorities such as McConnell, MccGwire, or Kaplan [fief. 7]
when they isolate incidents of naval power and influence.
These three sets don't correspond perfectly, but the degree
of agreement is very high, and it suggests the following
chronological list which will be used here as the outside
limit of the data set considered:
1. Air support to Yemen (1967)
2. The June War (1967)
14

3. Ccmtatants in Egyptian Forts (1967-1973)
4. The Pueblo incident (1968)
5. The EC-121 incident (1969)
6. Naval visit tc Somalia (1969)
7. The Ghana incident (1969)
8. The West Africa Patrcl (1 970-present)
9. The Jordanian Crisis
10. The war of Attrition between Egypt and Israel (1970)
11. Extended Somali port visits (1970)
12. Air Support to Sudan (1970)
13. The Indo-Fakistani conflict (1971)
14. Tfce Sierra Lecne port visit (197.1)
15. Reaction to the Mining of Haiphong (1972)
16. The Seaiift cf Moroccans to Syria (1973)
17. The October War (1973)
18. Support for Egyptian blockade of Bab-el-Mendeb Strait
19. Scviet sea and airlift to Syria
20. Seaiift of South Yemeni troops (1973)
21. Pert visit to Latakia, Syria (1974)
22. The Angolan crisis (1975)
23. The Horn of Africa (1977-78)
24. The Sino-Vietr.am War (1979)
Though all of these will not be developed in detail,
several will, and the purpose of this listing is primarily
to help the reader develop a sense of which incidents fit
into the analysis and which do not. The basic criteria for
selecticn were:
1. Soviet naval involvement.
2. A focus of action at cr near a Third World nation
lecated beyond tactical aircraft range of the Scviet
littoral.
3. At least a strong potential for U.S. naval involve-




III. FRAMES OF REFERENCE
The idea of scaling levels of Soviet intervention and
viewing the various incidents in the context developed is
not new. The two leading writers in the field have each
offered frameworks for understanding the use of Soviet naval
power, MccGwire focussing on the differing levels of commit-
ment en the part of the Soviets, and McConnell developing a
more elegant, if still static paradigm based en what he
calls "rules of the game." It is worthwhile to take a brief
look at these two studies in order to understand the views
of the established authorities in Soviet naval matters, and
to better understand the points of departure from which this
analysis proceeds. These men were chosen not only because
their wcrk is recognized as authoritative, but because they
are the only experts to take up the task of applying a
regular framework to the naval interventions.
A. MCCGHIRE'S COMMITMENT SCALE
MccGwire, in the article "Soviet Naval Doctrine and
Strategy," [Ref. 8: p. 142] cites Admiral Gorshkov, and
takes him essentially at his word when introducing the
subject cf the rele cf the Soviet navy in peacetime:
" (Gcrshkov cites) the necessity of * establishing the
conditions for gaining command or the sea (at the outset
of war) while still at peace.' The measures he lists
include 'forming groupings of forces and so disposing
them in a theatre that they have local superiority over
the enemy, and alsc providing the appropriate organiza-
tion of forces in the maritime theatres cf operation
(sea and ocean), and a system of basing, command and
control, etc., as reguired by their missions.' These
reguirements could well be used to describe the pattern
of Soviet activity since 1964, when the navy first began
to ffetablish significant forces in distant sea areas, a
process which is still in progress today."
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But MccGwire does not have great confidence in the progress
the Soviets have made in these areas, for he notes later
that with the growth of detente, the Soviets in 1973 appar-
ently decided to liiit their direct participation in over-
seas matters to
"..•the provision cf advisors, weapons, and strateaic
logistic support, the combat role being delegated to *he
Soviet-equipped forces of •revolutionary* states such as
North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba." [Ref. 8: p. 163]
This is mentioned because a major difficulty with MccGwire's
analysis, and indeed with most people who tackle the topic,
is that he seems to be of two minds when the matter of the
actual use cf naval power arises. What is the value of all
the infrastructure building described in the long quotation
above if the combat rcle has been delegated? What are the
Soviets trying, or hoping to do with their peacetime naval
force employment?
He delineates four "types of objectives which underlie"
these deployments, and roughly scales them according to the
degree cf political commitment required of the Soviets.
They ar€ offered here in the same order that MccGwire
presents them because he does not even ordinally rank them,
rather presenting the first as the low end of the spectrum,
the second at the high end cf commitment, and the third and
fourth as belonging scmewhere in between.
1. Protecting Soviet lives and property. The example
offered is the 1969 rescue of Soviet personnel from
Ghana.
2. Establishing a strategic infrastructure to support
war-related missions. Here he points to the develop-
ment and use cf facilities in Egypt and Somalia.
3. Increasing Soviet prestige and influence. This is
the general category cf showing the flag in port
17

visits, sweeping mines from Bangladesh or the Bab-el
Mendeb Strait, and logistic support for revolutionary
forces or a threatened regime.
4. Countering imperialist aggression. The specific
examples offered are the Guinea episode in 1970 and
the support of Cuban and MPLA forces in Angola in
1975.
He guickly makes the point that is obvious from the
scale by saying that Soviet political commitment in terms of
"risking major conf rcctation with the West" is low. Thus
Soviet acts in countering imperialist aggression and
increasing their own prestige and influence are lesser
commitments than developing strategic infrastructure because
it is assumed that they will not attempt to violently
counter western aggression, and the influence is essentially
hollow. It is in this area that my analysis will most radi-
cally depart from MccGwire*s, as it will be here assumed
that Soviet naval forces can fight at least up to the level
of their physical capabilities, and that their presence
cverseas represents a set of specific military threats to
ether naval forces aid to forces ashore. MccGwire makes a
worthwhile point when he puts emphasis on the development of
infrastructure, for the traditional limiting factor in
Soviet pewer projection capabilities has been sustainability
of ships, or anything else, away from Soviet soil. This is
developed in more detail later, but it must be noted that
because the Soviets no longer have access to the facilities
they developed in Egypt and Somalia, one cannot conclude
that they are incapable of acting with force on any scale
beyond their immediate neighboring countries. This is a
limiting factor, but not to the degree of obviating the need
to consider what deployed Soviet ships are actually capable
of when "cut-of-area" or beyond home waters.
18

HccGnir€ fs analysis goes on to note that the real devel-
opments have been in the provision of logistic support
before and even during the course of "third party
conflicts." He cites several examples from the 1973 war in
the Middle East, which will be considered further in the
next section, with the final and "most significant" develop-
ment being the stationing of surface to air missile (here-
after SAM) equipped ships under the final approaches to the
main resupply airfields in both Syria and Egypt, "as if to
cover against Israeli air attack." 5 This seems to differ in
kind as *ell as degree from mere logistic support and, if
the stationing was truly significant,- promised to create
something larger than a third-party conflict once the
missiles were used.
Finally, he suggests that the Soviet Navy is part of a
policy cf incrementalism, that is of "probing Western
responses and establishing precedents." His point here is
that Western response will shape the role of Soviet military
presence overseas.
MccGwire says that his general argument requires the
acceptance cf two essential distinctions. The first is to
distinguish between the use cf Soviet naval power to insure
the safe transit of logistic supplies carried by Soviet
transports to support a client, and their use to prevent
Western intervention against a client state. The second is
to distinguish between Soviet willingness to risk hostili-
ties with a third party state and their historic and contin-
uing unwillingness to risk a military confrontation with
O.S. naval forces. From the point of view of this study the
distinctions are confusing and ultimately without merit.
Again, we wonder whether there is any expectation that the
s rfief. 8: p. 166]. The core of the scaling argument
that ce makes is on pages 1 6U to 166 of the article, and the




ships ar€ to be considered a genuine threat. The Soviets
appeared tc be using SAM-eguipped destroyers to esccrt
supply ships heading toward Syria during the 1973 war with
Israel. 6 These ships were probably reacting more to the
possibility of Israeli patrol boat or air attack than to the
likelihood that the United States was going to intervene,
but little is gained from this point. There are few enough
examples of anything that cculd be considered Soviet convoy
operations to make the surface distinction rather facile.
If the implication is that the Soviets will shoot in the
former circumstance tut not in the latter, then this paper
will contend that though the conditions for violent Soviet
naval preventive activity may not yet have arisen, it is by
no means assured that they never will. This point applies
as well to the seccnd distinction— Soviet reluctance to
engage U.S. naval fcrces is governed by a set of calcula-
tions based upon variables with political, economic, and
military dimensions. All dimensions, particularly the last,
have changed significantly since MccGwire wrote his paper,
and though the distinction exists, it is measurably
different.
finally, MccGwire's scale is not intended to reflect the
dynamics of superpower confrontation at sea, and so dees
not. The typology tc be presented here is so intended, and
has the specific goal of describing patterns of escalation
that can be recognized for the purpose of predicting the
consequences of decisions made by parties to the
confrontation.
^Stephen S. Roberts, "Superpower Naval Confrontation,"
in [Bef. 9: p. 201 ].
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B. MCCCNNEIL'S BOLES OF THE GAME
James McConnell, of the Center for Naval Analyses,
provides a much more ambitious framework for understanding
U.S. -Soviet power relationships in Third World crisis situ-
ations. In fairness to MccGwire, the comparison should not
be made tecause McCornell was doing exactly this and it was
not MccGwire's intention to create such a framework when he
published his commitment scale. The primary objections that
were given with regard to MccGwire' s scale are net appli-
cable here because McConnell is careful -co point out that he
is concerned exclusively with the relationship between the
superpowers, and hew they affect the other's choice of
action or inaction.
The analysis begins with three factors which govern the
strength of the superpower's political will. 7
1. Relative force capabilities.
2. National resolve, or guts (his word), and
3. Motivation, including
a) Relative value of interests involved, and
b) The fact of posessicn of the interest, or the
"inertia of the status quo."
With regard to relative force capabilities, he makes
several very cogent cbserva tions. First, that the status
quo as presently perceived is one of U.S. superiority at
sea, and therefore th€ relatively less capable Soviet forces
that appear in cases of confrontation are an expectable
consequence of that asymmetry rather than a lack of Soviet
resolve. The important corollary, which serves the purpose
cf bringing the whele question into the harsh glare of
7 &H this material, including direct quotations unless
otherwise noted, is taken from McConnell 's "The 'Rules of
the Game 1 : A Theory on the Practice of Superpower Naval
Diplomacy," in [ Hef . 9: pp. 240-278]. McConnell* s discus-
sion of the place of coercive diplomacy in the larger
context cf Soviet naval strategy and missions for the year
2000 appears in [Ref. 10: pp. 39-67].
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reality, is that actual ccmbat at sea is more and mere
likely tc produce an outcome so dependent upon the minute to
minute changes in shies headings, weather, equipment, and
ether factors, as to be unpredictable by policy makers
beyond a certain level of confidence. The goal, moreover,
is to "give a good account" and prevent a fait accompli mere
than it is to match fleets. 8
Thus a more reasonable sense of superpower confrontation
emerges, one that accounts fcr the extreme disparities in
capabilities between Soviet "anti-carrier task groups" that
are often described, and the U.S. forces that they are
supposed to be intimidating. But McConnell does not take
Cable's notion as far as I have, instead making the contra-
dictory observations that force augmentation is usually
directed against opecsing clients, and that the observed
Soviet aim at sea is to match carrier and anti-carrier
groups. Having fallen back into platitudes just before,
"...beyond a certain level- -the level, as it turns out, of
mutual credibility--force competition at the local level
does net drive the ccupetition as a whole..." he notes that
there are no examples of one superpower rushing in forces to
achieve a fait accompli. What has been seen are the Soviets
arming up against the Israelis, and the matching of anti-
carrier tc carrier groups. He seems almost to be missing
his cwn point, that there is indeed a point of mutual credi-
bility at which local force levels drive the superpower
competition, and that "credibility" of military capability
is so scenario-dependent that the status quo of U.S. superi-
ority is more vulnerable, and the Soviet local threat more
significant, than casual comparisons would suggest. So this
analysis will contend that force augmentation by the
Soviets, specifically against U.S. naval forces, dees occur




and attains a credibility outstripping the simple physical
capabilities of weapons systems because of the uncertainties
of constantly changing local scenarios, and the perceived
status quo of a. S. superiority, indeed invincibility, at
sea.
When McConnell describes what he means by "national
resolve" or "guts" it turns out to be just what we thought
it was and the concept is not sharpened up artificially. He
does make the point that historically intervention and shews
cf force have represented a measure of national resolve for
roth cf the superpowers, and that each has been sensitive
enough to this to avoid intervening alongside or against the
ether.
The third factor in the relative strength of political
will is what McConnell calls "motivation." This is really
the key point of the argument, and as we will see, it
suffers primarily from the confusion of "relative interests"
into a three tiered concept (with the status quo and motiva-
tion) , and from the unnecessary attempt to turn the concept
cf the protection of the status quo into a general concept
when it differs entirely between the superpowers.
When McConnell gets down tc what really happens in these
conf rentatiens, this is what he says:
"If the U.S.S.R. is defending the status quo the reluc-
tance cf Washington to breach it outweighs any capabili-
ties differential that might be in its favor. On the
other hand. if Washington is supportina the status quo,
its strength of political will from this source, plus
the insurance provided by superior local capabilities,
is enough to override Moscow's tendencies toward indif-
ference to the fact of possession." [Ref. 9: pp.
245-246]
So although he gees en to make general statements about the
"patrcn" in the general sense receiving invitations to
intervene only from the general "client" when the latter is
on the defensive "strategically," thus putting the status
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quo in jeopardy, he would have done barter to quit while he
was ahead. As the quotation above indicates, McConnell is
well aware that there is no general "patron," there are only
the twc superpowers, who view and react to the status quo in
completely different ways. The relative interests of the
Soviet Onion and the United States are not comparable given
a generic client in trouble, and certainly he oversircplif ies
when he says,
"Fcr mcst of the Third World, then, the rough parity in
interests and the mutually credible capabilities act to
cancel out these factors and leave •the fact of posses-
sion 1 of the interest at stake as the key variable."[Ref. 9: p- 248]
The Soviet "interest" in every non-Marxist Third World
country is turmoil and revolution, while the U.S. interest
is in, at a minimum, the social stability that permits
normal international trade and other relations. There is
little parity in these interests unless it is non-interest.
With all this in mind McConnell presents a classifica-
tion scheme to clarify how specific cases of Soviet Third
World diplomacy of force should be seen relative to one
another. It is summarized below. Cases are placed in three
"divisions" which break down into seven "categories."
1. Security on the High Seas.
a) Protection of Soviet or client assets.
i) Sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria (1973)
ii) Sealift of South Yemeni troops (1973)
iii) Hesupply of Syria by Soviet ships and
aircraft (1973)
iv) Angolan crisis deployment (1975)
2. Third World Domestic Security.
a) Supporting Domestic Authority of Soviet client.
i) Air support of Yemen (1967)
ii) Port visit to Somalia (1969)
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iii) Exterded Somali port visits (1970)
iv) Air support to Sudan (1970)
v) Sierra Leone port visit (1971)
vi) West Africa patrol (1971 and after)
b) Protecting Soviet citizens vs. an established
government.
i) Ghanaian incident (1969)
c) Supporting a faction in an interregnum.
i) Angola (1976)
3. Third World International Security.
a) Supporting a client vs. an "outlaw" state.
i) West Africa patrol (1970-71)
b) Support of client vs. Western great powers
i) Pueblo incident (1968)
ii) EC-121 incident (1969)
iii) Jcrdaiian crisis (1970)
iv) Indo-Pakist ani crisis: two cases (1971)
v) U.S. mining of Haiphong (1972)
vi) Bab-el-Mendeb blockade (1973)
c) Support of client vs. a Western client.
i) June War (1967)
ii) Soviet combatants in Egyptian ports
(1967-73)
iii) War of attrition (1970)
iv) October War: three cases (1973)
v) Latakia port visit (1973)
On the face of it, the organization seems reasonable,
although creating a "category" to contain a single example,
as he dees with the three African examples from 2.b) to
3. a) , seems artificial. When these three cases are set
aside, as exceptions or special cases, the remaining cases
can te broken down into the three main "divisions" without
any mere extraneous clutter than to simply note the two
general types of "Third World International Security" cases
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and to point out the exceptions. But even with Occam's
razor thus applied, the scheme seems to be static, and to
offer little guidance in the understanding of the points he
has developed: capabilities, resolve, and motivation. As
each case is discussed, a point is made about the sense of
the status quo that was at stake, but there is not, unfortu-
nately, a convincing sense that each of the categories has
captured a single, collective notion of the status quo than
includes all the cases within it. For example, the category
of "Support of client vs. Western great powers" is a hedge-
podge of situations. The two Korean incidents and the
Egyptian blockade seem to represent a client violating the
status quo and the Soviets either supporting their own flank
or officially ignoring the situation. This is hardly a
homogeneous grouping of "client support" cases, and the role
of the Western great powers varies widely as well.
One leaves the "Fules of the Game," then, with several
important new notions, such as the "status quo" and the
scenario-dependence of actual force comparisons, but with a
platitudinous definition of the factors in the strength of
political will and a forced framework for the comparison of
specific cases.
The purpose of this part of the analysis will be to cut
away still more of the confusion by considering U.S. and
Soviet ccst-benefit factors to be totally different. That
is, ' we eschew any hepe of a general theory of patron-client
relationships and consider the calculations solely from the
Soviet pcint of view. This analysis is also intended to be
dynamic, to describe how a case progresses from one type of
demonstration to another, and how the reactions of the
United States might fce measured by the Soviets. Finally,
this analysis entertains the possibility that Soviet calcu-
lations might include combat, directly against American
ships and against third countries.
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IV. S OVI ET COST-BENEFIT FACTORS FOR INTERVENTION
As we have seen, both the experts cited considered the
calculations that the Soviets make before deciding upon the
level or type of naval demonstration that they will embark
upon in a specific case. MccGwire wrote explicitly in terms
cf the benefits of protecting Soviet lives and property,
increasing prestige, countering U.S. aggression, etc., and
more implicitly of the risks and costs associated with these
benefits. McConnell, especially when, discussing the rela-
tive force factor and the relative interests in the status
quo, was considering costs and benefits associated with
naval demonstrations by either superpower. Here wa will
focus exclusively on costs or risks as they balance against
expected benefits for the Soviets in the calculations that
they might make when deciding the level of commitment to
extend through the ccurse of a naval confrontation in or
near a Third World ccuntry. The factors will be considered
individually at first, but it should be borne in mind that
the actual calculations made by the Soviets are certain to
aggregate these factcrs uniquely in each new situation.
That is, there will be circumstances where ideological
consideraticns are negligible, and military factors over-
whelming. In other cases, military considerations may be
important, but economic constraints prohibitive.
A. PCLITICAL/IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS
As the self- proclaimed leaders of the worldwide revolu-
tion against capitalism and imperialist exploitation, the
Soviets find themselves with a fairly predictable role to
play in the Third Wcrld crises that arise. The primary
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decision is the level of involvement rather than which side
to support. Their degree of involvement, of course, has
qualitative measures, and from the political/ideological
point of view, it has a spectrum of risks and benefits to be
measured and traded off.
1. The Revolutionary "Status Quo"
as we have mentioned before, if there is indeed a
"status quo" (in McConnell's sense) that the Soviet Union
has a vested interest in sustaining it involves revolu-
tionary struggle in ncn-communist states. The Soviet mili-
tary in general has a role to play in supporting armed
revolutions and the Navy in particular is well suited tc the
task. Gcrshkov generalizes this way:
"The invincible military power of the Soviet Union forms
an integral part of the military potential of the whole
socialist community..." [Ref. 5: p. 246.]
The Soviets initially saw the world broken into two basic
divisions, and they saw themselves as the natural allies of
the post-colonial societies whose people were, from the
ideological point of view by definition, hoping to join the
Socialist Community. The United States, on the other hand,
was seen as the leader of the "colonialists" who would
continue the oppression of these people if permitted to.
The ideological bifurcation of the world was absolute in
this Leninist/Stalinist view, and the inevitable struggle
was not expected to end in compromise. Khrushchev intro-
duced a more flexible sense of the complex "roads to
socialism," and the possibility of "peaceful coexistence."
Eut even peaceful coexistence "...represents, as is well
known, a specific form of class warfare between socialism
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and capitalism in the international arena." 9 So at this
level, the level of pure ideology that has a concreteness in
Soviet life that is difficult for Western minds to appre-
ciate, the Soviets must consider the long range consequences
cf Third Wcrld ccnfrcntations very carefully. However flex-
ible Soviet ideology has proven to be when change was neces-
sary tc support perceived national interests, there is a
cost or risk to be incurred when an ideologically-based
legitimacy is tested by overseas actions (or failures to
act) that are inconsistant with stated policies and beliefs.
2 . Cos t/R isk Factors
The essential factcrs of ideological risk can be
summarized as follows:
a. Perceived Lack of Resolve Relative to U.S.
If the Soviets are to make any significant ideo-
logical investment in a revolution, they must be sure that
they are net in a position to see it swept away by the U.S.
Interestingly, the Scviets have made little public commit-
ment to revolutions that they see as not yet viable, or in
danger of being overthrown by Western forces of any kind,
for example, in the Caribbean, only Cuba has enjoyed the
full benefits of Soviet ideological commitment to it's exis-
tence. Manley in Jamaica and Bishop in Grenada had Cuban
support, but no public acknowledgement by the U.S.S.R. that
they were revolutionary states. When Grenada fell to the
U.S. and Eastern Caribbean forces, Castro took no ideolo-
gical responsibility for the loss, saying that the revolu-
tion was over when Eishop was murdered, and therefore by
implication that the Socialist Community had no obligation
to support Grenada beyond that day. Even Nicaragua has not




been acknowledged as having joined the larger Socialist
Community, although it has been encouraged mightily down the
correct path. The risk being considered, then, is one
rarely taken, and one taken only when a great benefit is to
be had, as it was in Vietnam and Cuba, perhaps the only
Third World states tc enjoy a status that warrants this sort
of ideological risk.
r. Competition from the P.R.c.
Although the Soviets do not acknowledge any
competition for the leadership of the Communist world, the
Chinese, since the 1960s, have independently offered -he
Third World an alternative source of aid and revolutionary
ideology. From the Soviet point of view, a lack of resolve
could create an opportunity for the P.R.C. that could be as
damaging as any created for the West. P.R.C. competition in
East Africa during the 1960s probably had an emboldening
effect upon the Soviets, as the character of the revolu-
tionary marketplace of ideas was radicalized by the Cultural
Revolution. Chinese retrenchment has made the competition
less visible, but they are by no means out of the game and
they exercise the available opportunities to criticize
Soviet failures of will or ideological purity in the Third
Rorld.
c. Conflicting Revolutionary Goals
The obvious example is the case of the Eritrean
rebellion, which was materially supported, at least indi-
rectly, until the Mengistu regime achieved power in Addis
Ababa. The Soviets are now, alongside the Cubans, assisting
the Marxist Ethiopian government in putting down this same
revolution. This is ideologically confusing from a purely
Leninist point of view, but the early help for the Eritreans
was opportunistic, and the present policy has the larger
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benefit cf supporting a pan-African status quo that, amcng
ether things, recognizes the legality of colonialist
borders, opposes secessionist insurgencies, and stands
opposed to cross-border military actions against a recog-
rized government of any kind. i(> Not exactly virgin commu-
nism, but a policy that keeps the Soviet foot in the African
door, where it might not otherwise be given the record of
success of the first wave of post-colonial socialist
regimes.
d. Identification With the Unsavory
Soviet pragmatism has extended as far as
supporting Idi Amin, whose reported cannibalism was probably
as difficult to rationalize ideologically as was his contin-
uing dctage for the Queen of England.
The risk inherent in this sorr of pragmatism, of
course, is a dilution of the ideological foundations of the
anti-imperialist revolution that they ultimately hope to
promote. This is a genuinely felt, risk, as we have noted
before, without a directly corresponding, ideologically
explicit analog for Western decision-makers. It is not,
however, a risk that outweighs the importance of having a
presence in a critical geographic location, or a position
from which to pursue the establishment of a more acceptable
regime at seme future time.
3 • Eenefit Factors
If the Soviets successfully assist a Third World
revolution the beneficial ideological fallout is manifest.
The two main categories of ideological benefit to be had
are:
1 <>A concise and informative discussion of the Horn of
Africa in just this context appears in Richard Remnek's
"Soviet Policy in the Horn cf Africa: The Decision to
Intervene," in [fief. 12].
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a. Validating the Revolutionary Paridigm
All their chips are riding on one great roll of
the historical dice. Of course the confidence is that the
faces all have six dots, but it provides crucial grist for
the self- justif icaticn mill, and clearly must bolster the
sense of security of the existing communist regimes, whan
the plan is seen to proceed. Communist ideology reguires
that it be on the ascent, and capitalism in decline. On
this large scale, the benefit can be guite grea- if a
victory ever the imperialists is called for by doctrine, or
if the conseguences of losing would include compelling
evidence that the world revolution is in decline.
t. Affirming Leadership of the Revolution
In the ideological battle with the P.R.C., the
demonstration of a willingness and a capability to assist
the revolution in the far corners of the world, with arms if
necessary, is a demonstration the Chinese cannot match. As
we will see below, capabilities drive intententions, and the
ideological capital (if you will) to be had from a unigue
reach with fraternal assistance is guite great. Who leads
the Ccmmunist World: the Chinese offering moral support
from Beijing or the Soviets, challenging the Americans off
the coast and fighting the reactionaries ashore? If the
occasion arises for this guestion to be asked, and the
Soviets take action, the answer will be clear.
E. ECCHCHIC FACTORS
Econcmics drive U.S. relations with the Third World
countries as much as they do with any of the larger nations.
Soviet Leninism is of course an economic theory of history.
This general discussion of economic cost-benefit factors for
Soviet decisionmaking in interventions will operate on two
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levels. Ax the macro level, there is a point at which the
West considers a ccuntry strategically critical to its
economic system. This is not to say that a particular form
of government is necessary, only that trade relations must
operate en an established basis without Soviet control. The
countries considered strategic in this way might include the
oil producing countries of the Middle East, perhaps South
Africa for its strategic minerals, and countries commanding
major choke points of world trade. The Soviets are obliged
to consider these countries to be essential to the survival
of the West, and therefore likely to be protected with that
existential importance in mind. At a more mundane level,
the Soviets have to consider that intervention costs rubles,
or worse, dollars. Ihere is a limited supply of each, espe-
cially the latter, and there is a point at which the supply




The general cost factors considered here are costs
for support of Soviet military forces rather than the
general military "aid" programs that the Soviets engage in.
Kith the possible exception of Cuba, unreimbursed Soviet
military aid does net seem to occur in the Third World.
Even the large investment in Vietnam is oriented toward
suppcrt cf Soviet forces, and the 1976 cancellation of war
debts was the only actual grant offered until 1979, when
military aid against the PRC seems to have been "paid for"
with unprecedented levels of Soviet military access.
a. Hard Currency Outflow
Military forces overseas cost money. The
Soviets go to great lengths to avoid buying ships bunkers or
provisiens overseas, unless it is from a client who will
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take payment in credits or rubles, because most countries
require hard currency. if an overseas presence was to be
maintained at any magnitude for any period of time, it could
get expensive, and the use of scarce hard currency might be
necessary for some provisioning.
If the overall size of the military forces had
to be increased to compensate for homeland defense forces
cverseas it would remove bodies from the productive sid = of
the labor market.
h. Follow-up Costs
If an intervention succeeds overseas, a contin-
uing presence of security forces is likely, either Soviet or
perhaps client state troops. In either case, barracks,
airfields, piers, fuel, etc. must be deemed worth the expen-
diture (if only in seme larger sense), and the assets must
simply be available from the economy.
In the Cuban case it was considered necessary to
build a Leninist society as an example for the developing
nations cf the hemisphere, at very high cost in general
economic aid.
c. Decreased Discretionary Resources
In a finite economy, if the budget permits only
one intervention, it precludes intervention when one is
already underway. Cne wonders how much of an effect the
investment of 85,000 men and their materiel in Afghanistan
had en the decision not to send troops into Poland. And
here we mean only the economic effect, although there was
clearly a military asset-husbandry motive to this decision
as well, and it is considered below.
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2- Ben efi t Factors
The economic benefits of intervention by the Sovists
are similar to the benefits that the United States hopes to
reap when pursuing the policies most often condemned as
"imperialist" by the Soviets. The Soviets need to develop
markets for their gocds. The "goods", of course, ar? arms,
and the statistics indicate that over half of all Soviet
exports to the developing world are in military equipment.
The trade is more likely to be of aging Soviet equipment
that has been replaced in the Soviet inventory with newer
models, but to the extent possible, the payment is in hard
currency, even in the case cf such desperately peer coun-
tries as Ethiopia and (until 1979) Vietnam. When hard
currency is not available, either from the country in ques-
tion or from a wealthy sponsor (such as Saudi Arabia for
Syria), then commodities are taken in trade at below-market
values. So to this extent, the Soviets have a positive
incentive to intervene if the market is worth developing.
Ihe economic advantage that might come from control
cf world choke points is worth considering as a benefit, but
realistically such leverage would not likely be applied
until a cataclysmic state of affairs had been reached. The
Soviets have little to gain from restricted trade. On the
contrary, as t he Soviet economy becomes more and mere
intertwined with the rest of the world, and specifically as
Soviet shipping and trade increase, their interests parallel
those of the West in the freedom of the seas. And in fact
the Soviets have consistently supported the principle of
free access to and passage of international waters, from the
Eosphcrus tc the Gulf of Sidra to the Panama Canal. So any
economic return to be had from control of strategic straits
is likely to be had only in the course of a major crisis





Tc begin our consideration of risk/benefit factors in
the Soviet decision to intervene from the purely military
point cf view, it is worthwhile to return for a moment to
the ccncept of the status quo introduced by McConnell. The
status quo perception cf the Soviet Navy relative tc the
United States Navy is that the former is considerably
inferior to the latter. The consequent expectation is that
the Scviets will back down in any serious, direct confronta-
tion, and that if Soviet and American forces actually
engaged one another in combat, the Soviets would be utterly
defeated. I hasten tc point cut that the U.S. Navy is less
sanguine than this abcut relative strength, but worldwide,
among the nations who must make policy based upon a sense of
who will control the seas in a confrontation at any scale,
it is widely believed that if the U.S. Navy is the leading
navy in the world, and that the Soviet force is not in the
same league. Therefore we should consider again the argu-
ment that for credibility each force must "give a good
account cf itself." Cbviousiy, a good account consists of
two very different sorts of performances. The very willing-
ness of the Soviets tc stand up to U.S. seapower puts them
en a new and higher level when it occurs. So the Soviets
have, at the level cf changing the status quo, little to
lose and a great deal to gain. They also have a good pros-
pect cf achieving the gains while "losing" the confrontation
en a tactical scale, in a similar sense to that in which the
United States is widely perceived as having been beaten in
the Tet Offensive of 1968, when by tactical military meas-
ures it was a clear American victory.
The Soviets, then, with a significantly inferior force
can take advantage cf surprise to use the constantly
changing situation at sea in achieving a tactical "victory"
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with strategic consequences. When this is taker, into
account, one can expect to find Soviet forces visibly
inferior to American naval formations, even when they
consider the likelihood of combat to be high. 11 This is not
the way that the Soviets would do things off their cwn
coastline, because the mission then becomes obliteration of
the threat and the assets include land-based aviation,
coastal ships, etc. In distant waters, the assets are
limited to those surface ships and submarines that can be
spared fiom the immediate coastal defense (including pro-
and anti-SSEN) missions, and the mission changes to the more
forgiving one of "giving a good account" at worst. A
"tattle-ale" destroyer trailing the carrier with four cruise
missiles, and a couple of cruise missile submarines tc add
confusion as well as firepower, together present a very
serious threat of a "good account." Especially if the fact
that the carrier must repeatedly reverse course to maintain
a proper wind angle as well as a station is used to mask the
training of weapons and put the carrier in its most vulner-
able position at the cutset of hostilities. 12
1 . Cos t/Risk Factors .
The most critical risk in any military intervention
is the ultimate expansion of the conflict to nuclear war.
Cgarkcv stresses this in the quotation that opened the
essay. A primary Soviet goal of intervention in a local war
would be to ensure that it remain local and not enlarge into
a worldwide conflict. There is every reason to believe that
the Soviets think that this can be done. Certainly Ogarkov
ll For a dissenting view, that "the overriding premise
(is) that the superpowers must avoid direct clash," see
fief- 13].
12 A discussion of the dependence of the outcome of a
naval conflict on the "precise details of the scenario" (or




does not dismiss Soviet involvement; he opposes local wars
because they are by definition the fault of the imperial-
ists. Because the Soviet Union is resolute they create the
dangerous ccnditions under which a Soviet-American conflict
might evclve, and that holds the danger of world war. This
danger is a reason fcr the imperialists not to start local
liars rather than an excuse for the Soviets not to get
involved.
Another basic sort of military risk to be taken is
the less of assets, including ships, submarines, aircraft
and men. Each is valuable, and each is replacable, up to a
certain point, should a loss occur. The thing to remember
about the Scviet consideration of the consequences of losing
assets is that the mission of homeland defense supercedes
all ethers and assets considered necessary for that role
cannct be jeopardized in other missions. Furthermore, a
ship that is unlikely to be used effectively in a given
situation should not be put at risk. These considerations
were probably behind a well-known incident during the 1973
Arab-Israeli war. During the course of the crisis, two
modern ASW cruisers were in the Mediterranean. A brand-new
"Kara" class ship, Nikola y ev, was in Yugoslavia making an
efficial visit with the Soviet Black Sea Fleet commander
embarked. The ship transited directly back through the
Turkish Straits on October 5, just prior to the beginning of
the war. A "Kresta-II" class ship of similar capabilities
transited down from the Northern Fleet, entering the
Mediterranean on 27 October, but it never moved into the
Eastern part of the sea, where the action was, before
returning heme in November. Finally, the two large ASW
helicopter cruisers cf the "Moskva" class remained in the
Elack Sea throughout the conflict. This is often inter-
preted as a sign of restraint by the Soviets, who could have
used these units to achieve "balance" in their Eastern
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Mediterranean force, which lacked ash ships. The restraint
might fce to keep the U.S. from fesiing a strategic threat to
its SSBNs, or because, as Stephen S. Roberts suggests,** the
missicn was to counter the carrier rather than any submarine
threat. This is very nearly it. The ships were valuable,
but only as targets. There was virtually no chance that
they could have been considered a significant threat to U.S.
submarines cf any kind in the sound saturated, shallow and
warm waters of the Eastern Med. If they found a submarine
it wculd more likely be one cf their own. The Kresta II, in
the narrcw transit lanes to the west, had by far the best
chance of detecting U.S. reinforcements, but this is also
difficult ASW water. Having no weapons primarily designed
for anti-carrier warfare, these units would have been
reduced to defending themselves in any conflict, which is
made the mere difficult when ycu are the largest target. As
open-ocean ASW platforms, defending the Northern and Pacific
fleet areas, these ships are optimally armed and certainly
needed, so their having been withheld from this conflict
should surprise no one. Finally, their involvement would
have had nothing but negative impact on the measurement of a
"good account."
So the Soviets can be considered to withhold units
for strategic reserve, but with an eye toward the likely
utility cf the ship in the crisis at hand. The conservative
scale of anti-carrier task groups formed by the Soviets
follows frcm the consideration that most or all of these
ships would be lost, and that their function would likely be
to inflict as much dairage as possible in the minutes avail-
able rather than to function as an integrated, multi-purpose
striking force. If the sole reason for withholding the Kara
Nik-olaev had been for strategic defense of the homeland, the
l3 In the chapter "Superpower Naval Confrontation," from
[fief. 9: p. 195]T
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ship would have transited to the North Atlantic, where it
could have teen of seme use, rather than back home tc the
Elack Sea.
Another factor at risk in the decision equation for
intervention is a possible loss of strategic ground relative
to the West. Since we are considering here only those
interventions well beyond the Soviet littoral, or buffer
states, there is net much history suggesting that the
Soviets have a public commitment to the use of third coun-
tries as military-strategic positions. Where they have
attempted to build overseas bases, such as in Cuba, Egypt,
Somalia, or by proxy in Ethiopia, Angola, and perhaps
Grenada, they have met with moderate success. But their
commitment to defense of their interests in these countries
has been measured, limited perhaps by a lack of ideological
justification for bases. Limited also by the simple lack of
military means to force compliance upon an unwilling
Third-World host. Presently the most strategically impor-
tant Soviet positions overseas include Cuba, where the U.S.
has expressly pledged not tc intervene, Vietnam, where the
likelihood of U.S. reinvolvement seems politically unthink-
able, and on a second level the proxy involvements in Angela
and Ethiopia. Air facilities in all these countries are
used by Soviet long-range military aircraft.
The loss of ailitary prestige is always a critical
matter fcr a nation that derives its international position
almost wholly on the basis of military strength. Soviets
have not shewn any willingness to embark on interventions in
which trere was a strong possibility of military embarass-
ment, but there has been little prestige to lose in the
third world, overseas situations considered here.
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2. Gai n/B e nef it Factors
The most obvious gain to be had by the Scviats is
the immediate goal cf the action contemplated, i.e. the
successful prevention of a coup d'etat, the successful
completion of a coup d*etat r the delivery of military
supplies, etc. On a larger scale, other benefits of Soviet
intervention seem possible.
although the Soviets have very few bases overseas
and publicly deny the need for any, they are keenly aware of
the military utility the United States derives from its
bases. If the upshot of a Soviet intervention is the imme-
diate, or mere likely the eventual expulsion of U.S. forces
from an overseas base the strategic gain for the Soviets can
te seen as proportional to the U.S. loss. This does not
require that Soviet bases replace the American ones, as
occurred in Vietnam. It simply reduces the capability of
the U,S. to efficiently carry out the military role it has
taken up throughout the world ocean, and it also reduces the
Soviet assets required to counter it. When Soviet access is
granted, the benefit is compounded, and it is worthwhile to
note that in each of the four cases listed above, there has
been a military commitment cf direct support (in the case of
Cuba)
,
proxy troops (in the African cases) , or comprehensive
materiel and training support directly against the United
States (in Vietnam) . That is, loss of U.S. influence and
bases overseas is a worthwhile goal in itself, and where a
military commitment cf some relatively profound type is
made, the gains to be had are most significant.
A moment should be taken here to point out that each
cf these places is cf considerable strategic value to the
Soviet military. Vietnam, of course, is within long-range
aircraft range of the entire South and East China Seas (and
consequently the whole coast of the PRC) , the whole
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Philippine archipelago, the Strait of Malacca and ether
trade routes, etc. Air access to Cuba and Angola permit
aircraft to cover virtually the entire Atlantic Ocean, to
the Cape of Good Hope, even when originating in the Soviet
Northern Fleet. Ethiopian-based aircraft can cover the
Northern Indian Ocean. These aircraft, of course, can
engage in reconnaissance, ASW, or even anti-ship strikes
with cruise missiles.
It is worthwhile tc note that holes in worldwide
coverage exist in the Southern Indian Ocaan, Southern
Pacific Ccean, and tte Mediterranean. The value of a recon-
naissance and strike capability in the Mozambique Channel or
the capes off South Africa suggest that continuing pressure
and even military intervention of some sort might be used in
the general area, tc include Mozambique, Mauritius, the
Seychelles, the Malagasy Bepublic, etc. Libya and Syria are
the most likely candidates for basing rights in the
Mediterrenean, and the South Facific simply doesn»t have a
great deal cf strategic significance anymore.
Ancther benefit to be had from a successful military
intervention would be the increase in military prestige and
international respect as a military power. We have consid-
ered the value this has in toppling the status quo sense of
Soviet pewer relative to American, but it would also build
Soviet credibility in the Third World as a viable threat or
protector. Various authors on the Soviet and U.S. side
write of the coercive effects of naval formations off the
coastlines cf small countries. If that force has no history
cf intervention and nc particular capability for it based on
the ships in the force, one wonders how serious a threat it
can be. Once the Soviets establish themselves as an inter-
ventional power, their credibility will climb tc ancther
plane and the ccercive value of each ship will increase.
That is, one ship from a navy that intervened successfully
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in a small country might be as persuasive as several from a
country that never has, at least it might in the mind cf the
leader of a small country.
Finally, there is a positive value in getting ccmcat
experience for military forces. The Soviets pay very clcse
attention tc the lessens of history, and one of them is that
combat-seasoned troops fight better than green troops. The
Soviet Orion has not engaged in large scale combat 1 * other
than the Afghan War since World War II. Except for the
unfortunate example cf the Eusso-Japanese War of 1905, there
is no history of majct Soviet naval battles since the advent
cf steam. To a certain extent the lessons of the battles of
ether countries can be adopted, but they must first be
filtered hypothetically through the Marxist-Leninist para-
digm, which results in several stages of removal from the
circumstances of the actual engagement before the lesson is
uncovered. The military leaders in the Soviet Union would
likely appreciate the superiority of direct experience in
testing the correctness of their military plans.
**Cne might be able to argue that the suppression of
Hungary In 1956 featured combat on a large scale, but it was
orders cf magnitude less than the Afghan experience and
different in kind frcm the sort of third-world intervention




- PJ2SS OF INTERVENTION— A DECISION POINT TYPOLOGY
The purpose of this section will be to illustrate seme
of the general trends to be found in examining Soviet naval
activity in the Third World, examine the stakes involved
historically, using the cost-benefit analysis we developed
earlier, and then use several case studies to break cut a
set of general principles through which the decisions that
the Soviets have mad€ can be compared, analyzed, and better
understood.
A. GENEBAL TRENDS
The general set of incidents that we are using here
consists of a wide variety of situations. Both MccGwire and
McConnell have been taken to task for trying to sensibly
organize the group, largely because their organizational
schemes were static and somewhat arbitrary. Having said
this, an obligation to provide a positive alternative is
incurred, and so one is offered.
Tables I and II, which are basically the McConnell list
with a few additions and deletions, are given in a strictly
chronological order with some key operational guestiens
answered fcr purposes of easy comparison. Chronological
order is chosen because it is naturally given and because it
would test illustrate how operational characteristics build
upon one another as a result of experience, if they do. I
contend here that they do indeed, and that previous experi-
ence with a tactic contributes to the options available in
the next crisis. How this works is not as obvious as it
appears at first blush.
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The questions across the top of the rabies are meant to
ask, in crder, whether the U.S. Navy presented a countering
force (USN?), whether the Soviet Navy presented an anti-
carrier warfare threat to U.S. forces (ACW?) , whether a
Soviet air or sealift was a part of the operation, whether
the Scviet Naval Infantry was involved (SNI?) , whether a
proxy force was being assisted in carrying out Soviet ccmtat
goals (EFOXY?) , and if the operation featured a new aspect
of Scviet response (NIW?).
To help with the overview it is useful to point out that
in every case where the U.S. sent ships, they were on scene
before the Soviet ships.
The June Mar is chosen as a natural starting point here
(as in HcCcnnell) because it represents the first large-
scale Scviet naval response to an incident beyond their
borders. The visits to Egyptian ports by Soviet combatants
after the war were probably the most dangerous activities
ever engaged in by deployed Soviet forces, as their purpose
was tc deter Israeli air attacks with the threat of raising
the stakes of the ccnflict, a dubious notion against the
most restrained adversary, which Israel is not. The air ACW
engaged in by the Soviets after the Pueblo incident was a
practice raid by Soviet naval missile bombers against the
large U.S. force that was generated in the Sea of Japan
after the Ncrth Korean attack. Interestingly, this was not
done against the even larger force that responded to the
shooting dcwn of the U.S.A. F. EC-121 reconnaissance plane a
year later. In that case, though, similar aircraft
performed reconnaissance of TF-71 (four U.S. carriers and
fifty other combatants) in the East China Sea two days
before they entered the Sea of Japan.
The Jordanian crisis of 1971 is very important because
it represents the first time that Soviet ships functioned
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below. It is also interesting that the posturing at sea
continued for a month after the Syrian tanks were repelled
and the immediate cause of the crisis was over.
The fcest African deployments began with Ghana in 1969, a
case of Scviet pressure to return seized Soviet fishing
ships. They became regular in the form of the "West Africa
Patrol" the next year, have matured considerably ever the
past decade and a half, particularly in the use of the
Soviet Naval Infantry as a standing force off the coast.
The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 might represent a Scviet
attempt to preempt the U.S. Navy in their deployment, a new
notion that will be explored in more detail below, and
unigue if true. In the response to the mining of Haiphong,
the Soviets made their primary ACW force a group of four
Echo-II submarines, which remained at anchor near the
Macclesfield Bank, and did not engage in exercise activity
against the very large (six carrier) U.S. force in the
Tonkin Gulf.
1973 saw the development of the amphibious forces in the
role of transporting third-country troops, first from
Morocco to Syria, then Omani insurgents from Aden to near
the Omani bcrder area. The ambivalence about calling them
proxy forces follows from the consideration that although
they were clearly supporting Soviet general interests in a
combat rele, they were not proxies in the same sense as the
Cuban trccps later sent to Angola and Ethiopia. 15
l5Jiri Valenta argues in [Ref. 15] that Castro's rela-
tionship with the MP1A was largely independent of Moscow's
contrcl until the imirinent collapse of Neto's regime caused
the Soviets to vastly increase the scale of their involve-
ment aid censeguently take ccntrol of the operation. Thus
it is an oversimplification to characterize the Cubans as
"proxies 11 until the massive sea and airlift began and Soviet
officers began directing the overall course of the conflict.




The October War of 197 3 startled many by the scale and
speed of the Soviet naval buildup. It is as startling,
though little noted, that the differences were largely of
degree rather than kind, and that every aspect of the soviet
involvement had been "field exercised" in a previous crisis.
The latakia port visit after the war was a classic example
cf the Scviets using a proven method. As the mandate for
the U.N. Golan Heights force was about to expire in November
of 1974, and the Israelis were pointedly complaining about
Soviet arms shipments to Syria, a combatant force carrying
Vice Admiral Khcvrin (then the Commander of the Black Sea
Fleet) pulled into latakia, the main terminus of Syrian
resupply. It was a scaled-up repeat of the visits to
Egyptian ports after the 1967 war.
The Angolan intervention exercised all the Third World
intervention skills available to the Soviets, with the
massive trocplift of Cuban forces and reported naval gunfire
support (NGFS) of MELA and Cuban combat operations repre-
senting new skills.
*
6 The use of Conakry, Guinea as a
staging point not only for the airlift but for large scale
cpen-ocean military reconnaissance reminds us, and them, of
the value cf the West Africa Patrol that was established
above, originally tc bolster a weak government. The
Ethiopian operation drew heavily on this experience, using
Aden in a way analagcus to Conakry.
The Sine-Vietnamese war of 1979 was interesting because
Soviet behavior was essentially similar to their support for
North Vietnam against the United States, but tactically
different in ways that reflect their different assessments
of the threat. The eleven surface combatants dispatched to
l *These reports originated in the Angolan press and
though possible, are unsubstantiated. They specitically
suggest that a Kresta II cruiser fired its 57mm gun at FNLA
positions in Lobito and Benguela, and that Soviet supplied
(and manned) landing craft shelled Mocamedes.
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the general area were better suited to command, surveillance
and self defense than anti-carrier warfare. 17
The transits of the Minsk and Novcrcssisk (follow-on
units cf the Kiev VTOI carrier) around Africa were signifi-
cant events in that stops in Luanda, Angola with the Ivan
J222I (° E her sister ship Ni kcla ev in the latter case) were
each time included in the itinerary. Mins k , in her 1979
transit, engaged in exercise operations off the coast of
South Africa, at a time when that country, the vanquished
enemy in the Angolan war, was suffering an oil crisis. The
Seychelles portvisits of the past couple of years have beer-
meant tc bolster the regime of President Rene, especially
when he is out of the country for any reason. Having
suffered several coup attempts, the presence of a cruiser or
an amphibious ship with Soviet Naval Infantry aboard is
considered a useful deterrent by the Seychellois government.
There are, clearly, several identifiable types of inter-
ventions that can be broken out in the ways that MccGwire
and McCcnnell did. The Middle East wars are obviously very
different operationally and strategically from the various
forays into Third World naval diplomacy, which themselves
arise frcm several different sorts of situations. But as
nilitary operations, there are problems and limitations that
characterize incidents more because of the physical reali-
ties cf distance frcm base or enemy capabilities, for
example, than the political or historical setting. And
there are tactical lessons that carry over from one type of
incident tc another, in ways that are at least as instruc-
tive as any attempt to find geopolitical reasons for mili-
tary events. The general trends in Soviet naval
l7The ships included a Kresta II AStf cruiser, a
converted Sveralov ccmmand and control ship, a Kashin, SAM
Kotlin, a Krivak, and two Alligators. All of the above
ships, except the LSTs, have SAMs for area or self defense,
and nc anti-ship cruise missiles are carried.
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intervention and support overseas have included the
following:-
1. 4.S. naval forces precede Soviet forces to an area of
contention.
2. The Soviets are willing to risk considerable danger
of attack, especially from Israel, to show support;
for an ally in a crisis. These risks, however, are
usually taken from a reactive rather than a tellige-
rant posture, e.g. the stationing of ships in
threatened ports.
3. Innovative tactics tend to appear in relatively lew-
risk situations, but once proven will be used consis-
tently if possible.
4. The Soviets seem willing to take a significant
portion of their regional major combatant order of
tattle out of the home fleet area, if the U.S. forces
that represent the primary threat are also deployed
to the same area.
5. The Soviets use the facilities they have acquired
overseas to support operations that might help open
up other facilities.
E. TBE STAKES
Given this brief immersion in the details of the naval
activity considered here, and the trends reflected over
time, it is useful to return to the three type of cost/risk
and benefit. A second look should provide a more concrete
notion of what the Soviets might be considering when they





- £hg Ideological Stakes
The key variable in ideological risk was
resolve—the commitment of the prestige of the Soviet state
and the CPSD to a conflict. An interesting observation can
te made in this regard simply by scanning the lis- cf coun-
tries for which naval support has been demonstrated. The
cnly country that cculd be considered a member of the
Socialist Community in the sense of requiring full Soviet
commitment is probably Vietnam. The point here is that if a
member of the "Socialist Community" is in trouble, the
commitment of the Soviet Union is automatic and irrevokable,
at least in the ory. This is a public fact, and the inter-
esting logical corollary is that the U.S.S.R. must be
careful whcm it publicly acknowledges as deserving this
distinction. Professor Jiri Valenta recently pointed cut 18
that the Soviets, despite the massive military investment
since December, 1979, have yet to refer to the Karmal
government in Afghanistan as a member of the Socialist
Community. The Sine-Vietnam case, of course, was a special
one in which the PRC, a renegade member of the community,
attacked another memcer. The ideological conseguences of
this were developed to the point of further attempting to
undermine PEC influence in the communist movement, but not,
of course, to the logical conclusion that the invasion
defied the laws of scientific history.
When revolutionary goals and practices seem incon-
sistent, or logically impossible, or obscenely double-
dealing (as in the case of the Eritrean rebels who found
their former Cuban instructors working for the central
government against them after 1977) the matter seems net to
arise in the ideological realm.
18In an address to a conference on the Soviet Invasion
cf Afghanistan, Monterey, California, 16 November, 1983.
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The use of naval power in support of ideological
goals, that is in being able to point to worldwide leader-
ship cf the revolution, seems to be growing in magnitude and
sophistication. The Ghanain incident began with the seizure
of Soviet fishing beats, but the seizure itself was justi-
fied by Ghana with the accusation that the Soviets were
aiding pro-Nkrumah rebels. Certainly Soviet rhetoric
supported them. Over the years, though, material aid to
"revolutionary" parties has been selective and opportun-
istic. When opportunity coincides with strategic value and
military capability, as it did in Angola, the support can be
massive and the propaganda victory on the ideological level
very considerable.
Ultimately, though, ideology is applied to the
events that occur around the world from the position of
power that the Soviets assume as the leaders cf the
Socialist world, that is, with complete freedom to interpret
events and responses for the benefit of the rest of the
"community." This is given attention, and surely a part of
the planning that goes into a decision to intervene, but it
seems unlikely that there could come an occasion when it was
felt that a strategically necessary intervention must not
take place en purely ideological grounds.
2. The Economic Stakes
large investments have been made in the military
suppcrt cf Third World countries supported by the Soviet
Onion* To the extent possible these investments have been
directly recouped in hard currency, but the limit of the
likely capability of a country to find currency, or a
willing sponsor with cil money, can be to a certain extent
projected. The real money-making relationships have been,
of ccurse, with the oil-rich nations themselves, such as
Libya and Iraq, where the market for arms might alcne
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justify military int€rventicn, even if the oil itself was
not directly available.
On another level, though, the strategic location or
history cf a country or region dictates that economic risk
te incurred. The Middle East is clearly a special case in
the strategic eguations of the Soviets as well as the West.
Large expenditures are considered worth the cost in Vietnam
and Cuba, where the Soviets ars- almost certainly not making
money, but where the level of access granted is offsetting.
The direct drain on the ledger sheet for overseas
intervention would seem to be concentrated in the area of
infrastructure for the direct support of Soviet forces
rather than in the "aid" given to the indigenous military.
In ccuntries like Vietnam, Ethiopia, Aden, Somalia, and
Egyp** among others, substantial resources have been cut
into basing facilities. In a few cases this investment was
lost, but the temporary benefit was probably worth the cost,
and the strategic advantage still to be had where the bases
continue to exist is very great.
3- The Mil itary Stake s
The military risks and benefits at stake in each of
the incidents vary considerably, and can best be broken out
by using tables as we did when considering the operational
characteristics. Tables II and III list the incidents chro-
nologically with a brief characterization of the risk or
benefit invclved in the same terms as previously considered.
The subjective values "None", "Low," "Moderate," and "High"
are given to the risks incurred by the Soviets in each
category, with the likeliest adversary added in parentheses
under the "risk to assets" column.
Such a table invites argument, of course, and where
a value seems difficult to understand, please remember that








INCIDENT SI .EII ASSETS GROUND PRESTIGE
67 War L-M M(US,Is) H H
67 Hostage ships I H(ls) M H
68 Pueblo M M(US) M H
69 Ghana N N N L
69 EC-121 M L(US) M M
69-70 Somalia N N N L
70 Jordan M-H L-M(US,Is] M M
70+ W. Africa N N N L
7 1 Indo-Pak L M(0S) L M
72 Haiphong M-L M-L (US) L M
73 Moroccans L M-H (US, Is)
L
L
73 Adan lift N L (Oman, US) M
73 October War M-H M-H(US,Is) H H
74 Latakia L H(ls) M H
75-6 Angola L M-L (US) L M-H
77-8 Ethiopia L L(US,Fr) M M
79 Sino-Viet L M(PRC) H H
79 Minsk N L(S.Af) N M
82-3 Seychelles N L(SOFs) L L
83 Novorossisk N N N L
i
i__ —— — — -———
that we are trying to understand. For example, in the
course of the Jordanian crisis, the Soviets applied unprece-
dented tactics of generating functioning anti-carrier groups
around each of the American carriers. This occurred during
the course of the standoff, and since the carriers were
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considered strategic strike assets by the Soviets, it seems
reasonable that there was an elevation in the level of risk
cf nuclear war between the superpowers, if only war through
inadvertance. That elevation is reflected in the "WW III"
column. At the same time, the the risk from American ships
to the Scviets is considered moderate because of the studi-
ously nor-aggessive stance maintained by the American naval
forces throughout the crisis. In the Haiphong mining
episcde, the risk of war is seen as having lowered when the
Echo-II submarine force stayed at anchor well away from the
American ships involved in the operation. Similarly, the
risk tc Soviet assets from U.S. ships dropped during the
Angolan intervention because the Congress made it clear that
no direct involvement would be tolerated. After the para-
lyzing Tunney amendment passed, in mid-December, the Soviet
sea and airlift dranatically increased in scope. Most
importantly, though, the purpose of the chart is tc illus-
trate general trends rather than to make points about
specific interventions.
In Table III we invite a comparison cf benefits
gained in strategic ground and military prestige to the
previously seen risks. Also listed is the specific military
goal cf the operation from the Soviet point of view and a
rating of the combat training value in lieu of true "ccmhat
experience." In any case where new "ground" is broken, as
in demonstrating a new combat technique, there is an incli-
nation tc give credit fcr at least "moderate" combat
training value, which may be inflating the true value cf,
for example, anchoring the four Echo- lis. It should also be
noticed that the measurements of prestige and strategic
ground tc be gained benefit from hindsight, but represent
the value of basing rights, etc., that the planner could
reasonably have hoped for, and in most cases got. For
example, though no basing rights are yet available in the
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Seychelles, if the Soviets do manage ro preserve the regime
in a crisis it seems reasonable to expect that a loosening
of restrictions might accrue, and air or naval basing rights
here would be of high strategic and prestige value to the
Soviets, especially since the buildup of Diego Garcia and
the end cf the "zone of peace" concept.
C. EF.CISICN POINTS
In the introduction to this section, a series of general
trends were isolated from the purely operational character-
istics of the Soviet naval involvement in the incidents
considered. The observations of the same incidents from the
standpoint cf risks taken and benefits expected tends to
confirm the previously held list of trends and gives seme
perspective as to why the particular response was chosen by
the Soviets. The trend over time has been to look for more
low-risk, high-benefit situations, as one might expect.
Where a ccmiEitment exists, hewever, as in the Middle East or
Vietnam, a response tc provocation from anyone will be made,
even at considerable risk or in an unpredictable situation.
There seems to be little evidence of Soviet escalation of
the potential risk in a conflict once underway in order to
make a greater benefit likely, although there is also little
evidence cf Soviet willingness to back down from an escala-
tion initiated by the adversary force. On the contrary, the
Soviets have in these cases applied very significant
portions cf their naval strength in order to continue to
have the greatest pessibile credibility. For example,
during the Jordanian Crisis the Soviets deployed three of
their five Elack Sea Fleet cruise missile ships to form ACW
groups around the U.S. battle groups. There is little
reason to believe that much mere than sixty percent of any






INCIDENT GOAL/VALUE GHOUND PRESTIGE
67 War Surveill,convoy/M M M
67 Hostage ships Deter ,solidarity/L H H
68 Pueblc Surveillance/M L M
69 Ghana Assat protect/L M M
69 EC-121 Surveill,Deter/M M M
69-70 Somalia Suppt. regime/L H M
70 Jordan AC w, Deter/
H
M H
70+ W. Africa Presence/L H M
7 1 Indo-Fak Preempt?/M H H
72 Haiphong Surveil,Deter/M L M
73 Moroccans Asst Syria/M M H
73 Aden lift Asst PAIGC/M M M
73 October War Surv, ACW ,Convoy/H H H
74 Latakia Deter Israel/L H H
7 5-6 Angela Estab. regime/H H H
77-8 Ethiopia Suppt. regime/H H H
79 Sino-Vistnam Suppt. client/H H H
79 Minsk transit Impress natives/L L M
82-3 Seychelles Suppt. regime/L H H
was probably the entire ready order of battle. 19 On the
ether hand, there is evidence that the Soviets make every
attempt to keep their involvement non-military as long as
l9For a description of the disposition of the ships see
Stephen Roberts in [Ref. 9: p. 173]. This analysis,
however, is my own.
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possible. Even when the stakes are high, the use or threat
cf fcrce is withheld until it seems necessary. where the
military risk is very slight, the Soviets are prone to keep
their military commitment proportionally small, even when
the potential gain is great, as in Angola.
A new set of general trends can be formulated, based
upon the operational observations, and speaking to the
cost-fcenef it calculations mads in the course of a conflict:
1. Recognize strategic necessities and make the enemy
know what they are.
2. Create situations only when they can be predictably
managed to their conclusion.
3. Maintain control of your economic and especially your
military assets.




5. Back up commitments at the appropriate level (ideolo-
gical, economic, or military) and be consistent.
6. Make military commitments credible by making them
proportional.
a) Identify and threaten the real enemy with the
appropriate type and level of force.
b) Communicate a willingness to use the weapon.
Before proceeding to the case studies, an important
reminder is in order. As we mentioned earlier, this study
is concerned primarily with Soviet intervention beyond these
areas that could be considered part of the strategic buffer
zone around Soviet borders. Operationally that was defined
as the area covered ty Soviet tactical aircraft operating
from the homeland. This definition, though, makes the
status of Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and the Korean
peninsula ambiguous, when in fact there is abundant reason
59

to consider them "strategic" to the Soviet Union. An
cbvicus and appropriate point to raise is that the increased
range of sea-based weapons in the 1950s and 1960s made the
Eastern Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan possible launch
points fcr nuclear-armed carrier aircraft and, later, subma-
rine launched missiles. Mosi of the cases of Soviet naval
force projection have been in these areas, though, and so we
must te careful about extrapolating lessons learned in one
regime tc another. This analysis states that with attention
to the contenders, the stakes, and the assets employed by
toth sides, this can te reasonably done.
D. CASE STUDIES OF DECISION POINTS
In crder to review a variety of the most important
cases, we will consider the JuDe War, the Jordanian Crisis,
the Angolan intervention, and the Sino-Vietnam conflict. As
a curicsity, the unusual deployments during the
Indo-Pakistani war cf 197 1 will be briefly reviewed for
evidence that it was a failed attempt at U.S. -style pre-
emptive deployment.
*• £h§ Jane War cf 196 7
Soviet interest in the Middle East is historical,
tut the Soviet decisions leading up to their involvement in
the naval maneuvers during the war are identifiable. Their
commitments were in the crder presented in our general
trends: ttey offered political encouragement to the Arab
socialist regimes in Egypt and Baathist Syria, and followed
up with economic support and military aid. When Palestinian
commandos used Syria as a base for attacking Israel, the
Soviets decided to offer ideological support only. The
first crisis decision points of the 1967 war came on 19 and
22 May when the Egyptians evicted the UN peacekeeping forces
60

from the Sinai and blockaded the Strait of Tiran, which
commands Israel's only access to the Red Sea. 'This latter
action, of course, is an act of war, and it violates the
right of free passage of international waters that the
Soviets have long supported. The Soviets kept a low profile
on the natter and expressed no interest in joining in any
attempt to reopen the strait against Egyptian will. The
effect cf the Soviet response was to demilitarize the
Egyptian act of war ty simply ignoring it. The West was
cddly cooperative in letting the issue lie until the war
settled it (among other things).
At this time, the American carriers Saratoga and
America «ere in the Eastern Mediterranean engaged in normal
exercises. A decisicn was made to put them under surveil-
lance ty Soviet destroyers. This had the effect of
providing accurate cata to Moscow as to the position and
activity of the carriers without presenting a serious
threat. Significantly, two cruise missile destroyers were
sent to the Mediterranean in the first week of June, just
before the war, to augment the tattletale force. The ships
were a Kilden and a Krupnyy equipped with the already obso-
lete SS-N-1 system. One "Kynda" class cruiser was in the
Elack Sea crder of battle, carrying eight SS-N-3 long range
missiles and reloads, but it was not brought down.
Soon after the war began on 5 June it was clear that
it would be a disaster for Egypt and Syria. The Soviet
support of her allies consisted of resupply, with a large
number of ships and aircraft bringing military replacement
stock. Eut this was essentially economic and moral support,
the Scviet Navy's protection of Soviet ships from Israeli
attack was not so much combat support of Syria as it was a
defense cf the right cf free passage.
when on 10 June Syria»s Golan defenses . collapsed,
Israel threatened to march to Damascus, at which point the
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strategic interests (ideological, economic, and military) of
the Soviet Onion were directly jeopardized. Kosygin
threatened direct intervention, but it was airborne units
that would have been used, not naval forces. 20 And the U.S.
carriers bcth sailed to the Levantine coast, disregarding
the cruise missile threat from the Soviet destroyers.
What was learned? The value of the tattletales was
probably the most inportant discovery. But the cruise
missile threat to the carriers was not credible and had no
effect on their movement to the war zone when they chose to.
Thus tee threat to the United States, the real enemy, was
net propcrtional. Even the airborne threat was a suicide
mission to raise the stakes to a U. S. /U.S. S. R. confrontation
that neither wanted. Only the direct risk of losing Syria
to the West made such a risk conceivable. So a credible
naval threat did not exist for lack of assets and tactics,
forcing a confrontation to a higher, less cost-effective
plane. And worse, the situation put Israel in the position
cf determining whether the strategic confrontation would be
necessary.
2. The Jordanian Crisi s of 197 1
Four years later, the Soviets used a roughly similar
circumstance to demonstrate that they now had the capability
to credibly participate in a crisis at the conventional
level, at least to the point where it was they who deter-
mined that it should escalate.
In 1970 the Palestinians were using Jordan as a
staging base for attacks against Israel. The Soviet Union
continued its relationship with Syria and Egypt, although
Egypt had by new split with Syria on the matter of the
"Rogers flan," which gave Jordan control of the West Bank to
zoAnthony R. Wells, "The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War," in
[Ref. 9: p. 166].
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administer the Palestinians. The Palestinians expressed
little regard for Hussein's rule, and were ordered expelled
on 15 September. Cver the next five days Jordanian and
Syrian Army forces clashed until the Syrians actually
invaded with a column of tanks that were pushed back three
days later.
The Soviets were close to Syria politically, tux
ambivalent because Nasser was the key to their Middle East
diplomacy. The United States interest was in the large
number of U.S. citizens in Jordan.
American response was swift. Airborne units were
alerted in the United States and in Europe. The carriers
Independ enc e and Saratoga were in the Eastern Mediterranean
and the John F. Kennedy was sent from the United States.
Soviet response was, this time, proportional and
credible. A Kynda cruiser, two SSM Destroyers, at least one
"Juliett" class missile submarine and several other subma-
rines were present to constitute a genuine anti-carrier
capability, especially when the Black Sea Naval Air Force
bombers in the Crimea are figured into the eguation. The
Juliett actually remained surfaced, with two Foxtrot subma-
rines, for a week during the crisis in order, one assumes,
to make her presence known. The case was made that the
United States did not have complete freedom of action in the
Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, it was for the first
time established that the Sov iet Union coul d exercise seme
coJLSJrSi £I®£ ik§ escalation of the conflict. It was no
longer true that a third party such as Israel could put them
in a purely reactive cr defensive position.
The decision point came when the augmentation of the
naval force was clearly for the purpose of anti-carrier
warfare. Furthermore, the anti-carrier posturing went on
until the U.S. forces left the Eastern Mediterranean, in
late October, one month after the original crisis had
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passed. Th€ strategic necessity was not so much the wester-
nization of Jordan, or the growth of U.S. diplomatic influ-
ence, or even the survival of the Palestinians. It was to
make the point that the Eastern Mediterranean was net an
American lake. And a confrontation that can be considered a
standcif with the United States Navy is a net gain for
Soviet prestige, as has been pointed out before.
3 • 1*1 € 19 7 5-76 Angola n Inter vention
In the strategic equation, Angola was little to
"lose" for the Soviet Union and a great deal to gain. No
guesticn of strategic strike advantages for the United
States existed (as in any case involving the Eastern Med)
and the third party to the conflict, Cuba, was controlled
from Mcsccw when the combat reached a high level of
intensity.
In October of 1975, 1500 Cubans were training and
advisinc fighters fcr the MPLA, which was contending with
the Zaire-tacked FNLA and the South Africa-backed UNITA for
contrcl cf the former Portuguese colony. On the 23rd, South
African regulars invaded frcm the South. An airlift by
Soviet military transport aircraft began, bringing military
supplies, but by mid-November the Cubans and the MPLA were
being pushed back toward Luanda on two fronts by the ether
groups. Cuban ships and aircraft had begun reinforcing
their ticops and 17C Soviet advisors were in country by 13
November.
In late November Zaire operated three Swift boats
eff North Angola and Cabinda, which it's FNLA group had
invaded. This was within 20 miles of the port of Pcinte
Noir, where Soviet arms shipments were made and where
several Soviet merchant ships were then docked. An
Alligatcr LST was dispatched frcm Conakry, Guinea (the West
Africa Patrol) as the appropriate response to the danger.
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Cnboard was an SNI detatchment with antitank rocksts and
SA-9 antiaircraft missiles visible on deck. Defense of
Soviet civilians and evacuation seemed possible. As the
coarse of the war continued to turn against the Cubans and
the FNLA, a SAM Kotlin destroyer began to transit from the
Eastern Mediterranean.
Cn 19 December the Tunney Amendment passed the
Senate, and although the House didn't vote for another
month, it seemed unlikely that the U.S. would intervene. 21
The Fcrd administration turned its attention to disrupting
the airlift by convincing first Barbados then the Azores to
refuse the Cubans landing rights. The Soviets sent long-
range 11-62 transports to continue tha Cuban reinforcement
via Conakry, as a Kresta II ASM cruiser left the
Mediterranean and transited to the Conakry area, perhaps to
provide navigation or other assistance to the airlift.
As the carrier Saratoga prepared to leave Mayport,
Florida for its scheduled Mediterranean cruise, the U.S. was
publicly complaining about Soviet naval presence in the
Angolan area. The Soviets had moved most of their ships to
the Conakry area, and were preparing a large-scale surveil-
lance effort across the Central Atlantic (to track U.S.
deployments) including Bear-D aircraft from Havana and
Conakry, an intelligence collection ship (AGI Vertikal) to
the mid-Atlantic along the great circle route from Florida
or Cuta to Angola, and a contingency ACW group in the
Western Mediterranean in case the Saratoga was detected
enroute to Angolan waters. The ACW group, consisting of a
Kresta I, a Mod Kashin, and a Juliett SSG never formed up
2l For a discussion of the American politics involved see
William F. Griffith's article "Soviet Power and Policies in
the Third World: the Case of Africa" in [Ref. 16].
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because the Saratoga deployed normally, to the
Mediterranean. zz
In the Angolan case, the commitments were clearly
made in the correct crder, and always at the appropriate
level cf response. The military commitment was consistent
and proportional, the ACW group described above being of
text bock composition, and especially credible in hindsight
because the Juiiett was discovered as it surfaced in Conakry
after the crisis wound down, after the Saratoga was in the
Mediterranean. The crisis was very well managed in the
sense that large assets were brought in, especially the
airlift, in relatively shcrt order, and adaptations were
made when the landing rights problem arose. The crisis, and
the Soviet assets, and the Soviet interest, were controlled
from Moscow with skill and restraint.
** • Vk%. Sin o-V ietnamese War
This conflict, between two communist states, is
raised again to reinforce a pcint made earlier. Soviet
commitments to Vietnam had long been ideological, material,
and military. The nilitary commitment, though, was against
the United States, and it operated within set boundaries.
When the adversary became the EEC, there was little inclina-
tion to go beyond the level of response previously exercised
against the U.S. The emphasis was on "escalation dominance"
to use Alexander George's term. 23 With the Pacific Fleet a
far more credible threat to the PRC than it was to the
United States, in fact a clearly superior force, the
22 Valenta, ;.n £ Bef . 17], describes the broad, range of
Soviet maritime involvement, including the alleged intimida-
tion of the Saratoga croup.
23Gecrge describes the needs of the superpowers (specif-
ically the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., although the concept
applies here) to have a visible means of maintaining the
upper hand in a series cf fcrseeable escalations cf a
conflict to feel secure. See [Ref. 18].
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opportunity existed tc exercise controlled restraint. The
Soviets could threaten a relatively significant level of
force against the PBC with several higher conventional
levels tc climb to if necessary. This is U.S. -style naval
diplomacy, and it reguires good command and control in crder
to work. AGIs were used for intelligence collection and
command and control ships were prepared to direct any mili-
tary action that might be deemed necessary: to defend the
convoys cf supplies or the Vietnamese ports themselves.
Begular Eear-D reconnaissance also helped the Soviets keep
the situation porpcrtional and predictable and under
control.
5
- lk§ ISiSziiiSiiiaSi War oj 1121/ A Non-Case
A case that stands out among the others for the
unusual operational characteristics of the Soviet deploy-
ments is the response to the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.
Because it is unigue in several ways, I have separated it
from the chronological order of the other case studies so
that the gualities that distinguish it are more easily seen.
The war began as a conflict between Bengali nation-
alists and the Pakistani government. In March of that year
the Pakistani government cracked down and massive numbers of
refugees began to enter India. India supported the Bengali
guerillas that were fighting the Pakistani government and on
3 December, Pakistani aircraft bombed targets in India as a
retaliatory gesture. Indian troops then advanced and took
Dacca on 16 December.
At the time cf the Pakistani airstrike, the British
Navy had a two-carrier force in the Indian ocean (the attack
carrier Ea^le and the commando carrier Albion, plus about
nine other combatant ships). Soviet and American force
levels were normal, and roughly egual. The Soviets had a
deisel attack submarine, a destroyer, an Alligator tank
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landing ship, and a minesweeper. The U.S. force was the
standard Persian Gulf force of two gun-destroyers and a
command ship. 2 *
About three days after the Pakistani strike, a
Soviet ACW group including a Kynda, a Juliett missile sub,
and a Fcxtrot submarine were dispatched from Vladivostok.
At the time, only the British carriers were in the Indian
Ocean to shoot at, and so McConnell and Calhoun conclude
that the group was directed at them. A few days later, on
10 December, the U.S. carrier Enterprise left Yankee station
in the Gulf of Tcnkin to form up TF-74 and steam to the Bay
of Bengal, actually preceding the Soviet ACW group through
the Malacca Strait. On the 12th or 13th, a second full-
fledged ACW group steamed from the Pacific Fleet area, this
time consisting of a Krest a I missile cruiser, an Echo-II
missile sub, and a Kashin destroyer. McConnell concludes
that this group was sent in response to TF-74.
If indeed these deployments were correlated to
events, in each case the response of forming an operational
ACW group tcok only about three days, and together the Kynda
and Kresta-I comprised two-thirds of all the missile
cruisers in the Pacific fleet. In all, a spectacular
achievement, especially considering that the ACW group
concept had been pioneered only the year before, in another
fleet.
As an alternate explanation that seems to be more in
line with operational reality, it will be suggested here
that the Indo-Soviet relationship was close enough 25 to
24 The description of the facts of this conflict is taken
at face value from McConnell and Calhoun in [Ref. 9: pp.
178-192.1. See alsc an earlier version in [Ref. 19: dd.
442-455]. The analysis offered here differs considerably
from theirs, as will be apparent.
25 A friendship treaty was signed during the Summer
preceedmg the war, and just before the war an Indo-Scviet




permit tie Soviets tc be informed of Indian plans for war,
which were made well in advance. If one assumes that the
Soviets intended to form ACW groups and deploy them pre-
emptively as a shew of support for India against the
impending and mutually feared Sino-American axis, then why
did TF-74 get there first? Because Pakistan surprised
everyone by initiating hostilities even while hopelessly
outgunned and out manned. Once the air strikes had taken
place, the war was underway and the Soviets had to send
their ACW groups along a bit sooner than expected, but not
as seen as a deployed and combat-ready TF-74 could steam
into the Indian Ocean. Why two ACW groups? Because the
British were already there, and Enterprise was the logical
U.S. response. So the Soviets extended their commitments in
the logical order, made plans for a proportional military
backup tc a crisis they knew would occur, and expected a
very cost-effective demonstration of Soviet naval pewer and
commitment for an important new ally. The only factor they
did not have advance knowledge of or control over was the
seemingly irrational Pakistani air strike against India.
And so, despite the best-laid plans, the attempt at a pre-
emptive ACW deployment failed, although the rest of the
f
scenario went off as it might have been expected to, with
Soviet-American naval interaction continuing for about two
weeks. It did not begin, of course, until five days after
the Pakistani surrender.
Ihere is no direct evidence to support the collusion
thesis presented here; it is based entirely upon the unlike-
lihood of such rapid Soviet naval response and the incen-
tives for both the Soviet Union and India to share such




VI. INTENTIONS. CAPABILITIES, AND INTERVEN TIONS
Th€ conclusicn that has arisen from the data sc far is
that there are indeed patterns to be found in Soviet inter-
venticnary behavior. At the purely operational level, it
was seen that the Soviets were invariably preceeded by the
O.S. Navy into areas of mutual interest. This, as the
Indo-Eakistan war suggests, is not because the Soviets have
a policy of reaction that is rigidly enforced. Rather, a
scarcity of anti-carrier warfare assets makes it virtually
impossible to be sure of an appropriate level of response,
and escalation dominance, unless a considerable period of
pre-kncwiedge of the crisis is available to generate ACW
formations. Given a commitment, though, the Soviets seem
willing to risk considerable danger of attack in order to
consistently support their own freedom to materially rein-
force and trade freely with their allies. That is, they
will enter relatively unpredictable situations with a high
possibility of attack from Israel or the PRC to guarantee
resupply of their clients. There seems also to be a reluc-
tance to try out new tactics in a situation that carries
high risk or cannot be pre-planned to its conclusion. When
pre-planning is done, there seems to be little reluctance to
commit a very high proportion of the available ACW assets to
a conflict, as long as the O.S. carriers are also likely to
appear. Finally, operations indicate that the Soviets use
overseas facilities very aggressively in order to extend the
range of their combat ships and especially to operate ocean
surveillance aircraft when a crisis can be forseen or
contrclled from the beginning.
The cperational data, then, suggest more than anything
else that the Soviet navy is likely to project itself with
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an intensity that is in direct proportion to the degree -hat
rational pre-planning can be expected to accurately predict
events. There are few signs of initiative, and whan new
tactics appear they seem to have been pre-planned and
applied to the first appropriate incident to arise. The
most innovative tactics have, interestingly, appeared in the
Eacific Fleet, which might be showing evidence of enjoying
it's remoteness from the General Staff. 26
Ultimately, a set of principles was derived that seems
to express the cost-tenefit calculations at any point in the
escalation of a crisis. Although the seven principles
offered have some of the same mushiness that prompted our
final criticisms of McConnell, each does have explicit
significance for Soviet decisions about use of their forces
in a crisis. For example, the order in which coirmitments
should be made is easy to follow, and most of the interpre-
tive fine points about where "economic" military aid ends
and direct "military" aid begins seem to have been worked
cut over time. This is enough to make the choice cf an
"appropriate" response to a crisis fairly automatic, and
"consistency" an appeal to intellectual conservatism, which
would be well-received in the Soviet Union. "Proportional"
backing for commitments becomes relatively straightforward
when the actual decision point is a consideration of whether
to send ACW forces or amphibious forces, for example, and is
driven ty an identification of who represents the real
adversary. The final four principles for decision making in
a crisis are very simple rules of management that might
arise from any "scientific" study of game theory or opera-
tions analysis.
26The examples intended here include pioneering air and
submarine dominated ACW tactics and the Indo-Pakistan
deployment. These all took place from 1969 to 1971,
however, so the new management since might be suffering the




Tc the extent that the limitations under which the
Soviets feel that they operate are known, then, we can
expect tc he able to make fairly accurate projections of the
operational decisions they are likely to make in a naval
power or influence projection scenario that arises beyond
Soviet heme waters. This also creates a baseline, depar-
tures from which deserve special attention from U.S.
planners.
The critical variables to be considered in making these
projections ultimately revolve around the capability of the
Soviet Union to act. This capability is defined by ideolo-
gical, economic, and military constraints, of course, but
two important points must be made before this analysis
proceeds:
1. Capabilities drive intentions, and
2. Military capabilities best define the limits of
intervention.
There is a schocl of thought which holds that foreign
policy intentions precede the development of the capabili-
ties tc carry them cut. Certainly there could be no mere
rational way of carrying out the international functions of
government, and there is no argument in this analysis with
the notion that the Soviet government represents an
expressly rational philosophy. But in the real world of
military capabilities and intentions to carry out policy,
there is little doubt that only the most general intentions
can be served by weapons systems which take something on the
order of a decade tc develop and produce in significant
numbers. And the history of third world interventions
developed so far indicates that when military requirements
arise far from home, there is little warning and the
specific military tools best suited to the problem can vary
widely. The suggestion that military assets are wedded to
the intentions that prompted their original design seems
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unrealistic. More to the point, though, this analysis
rejects the suggestion that policy makers are limited in
their use of weapons to the tasks for which they were origi-
nally designed. That is, there is no intention here to
argue that the ships and naval infantry forces discussed in
the next chapters are specifically tasked with carrying out.
interventions in "local wars," or overseas interventions, or
even that they were designed with either as a secondary
function. Although most large naval ships are designed with
some flexibility of function, and I tsnd to believe that the
mission was indeed considered in the new designs, the point
is irrelevant to this analysis. It will only be contended
here that should the intention to so use such forces for
local intervention arise in the future, even if for the
first time, it is assured that the standing capability to
act at that time will determine the likelihood and scope of
any intervention that is proposed or carried out. If the
usefulness of Soviet naval assets for intervention can be
defined, then we have a parameter setting the outside
"limits of intervention." Whatever intention develops, even
if ncne exists today, is constrained by the military
materiel limits at the time interv entio n decisions are made .
The reverse is not true.
One of the better arguments for the view that naval
shipbuilding programs (i.e. capabilities) predict naval
missions (or intentions) is presented by Keith A. Dunn:
"If the USSR intended to alter its current naval posture
so as to handle these 'gray area 1 missions (the ability
to cppcse naval intervention, participate in a prolonged
theater conflict, engage in an extended 'war at sea,' or
fight an all-out conventional war) and to move away from
a sea denial role toward a sea control mission, analysts
would observe new trends in the rates of ship construc-
tion. Since navies are expensive and require long
lead-time constructions, one would expect to see some
major changes in the pattern of Soviet naval building.
However, no such changes are now apparent. Soviet ship
designers and builders still tend to concentrate their
efforts in two traditional •non-force projection' areas,
these of nuclear submarines and antisubmarine warfare."
[Hef. 20: p. 251]
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Earlier in the same volume, though, Donald Daniel's article
en the Soviet navy describes precisely the building programs
that, in this analysis represent a move to non-traditional
"force projection" capabilities for the 1980s and beyond. 27
Capabilities, of course, are more than just a measure of
weapons. The ideological and economic components of the
decision to act have been developed here and found to be
important elements. But they are also the more volitile
variables in the equation. Ideological standards can change
dramatically in the Soviet Union, in an address by the
General Secretary or by a succession in leadership as exam-
ples.. However predictable general economic trends in the
managed Soviet economy may be (and this is open to argu-
ment) , the decisions of the Politboro as to how they will
actually allocated and where an intervention might rank in
Soviet funding priorities are unpredictable. Shipbuilding
programs, though, project several years ahead of their
detection a general idea of what the Soviet oceanic forces
will consist of. Programs can be cancelled or cut back, and
merchant ships can be purchased from other countries (as
they often are by the Soviets) , but a good sense of the
lineup of ships is available for analysis.
The next two chapters will attempt to develop opera-
tional definitions of the actual capabilities of Soviet
raval interventicnar y forces. Assuming that at seme point
during the 1980s the ideological, economic, and military
factors describing a third world situation lead to a deci-
sion to intervene, the maximum level of interventicnary
capability should be available from careful operational
definitions of the Soviet forces available for the task.
27[flef. 20: pp. 136-137]. Among the new programs Daniel
mentions are the fourth "Kiev" class, the new large CTOL
carrier, the "Kirov," "Black-com." "Udaloy." and




First there will be an objective description of the physical
military assets available for use in a local war. In the
course of this discussion the overriding requirements for
homeland defense will be considered to develop a sense of
the ability of the Soviets to commit forces credibly through
the levels of escalation that might be required by the anal-
ysis sc far. Chapter eight will be concerned with an aggre-
gation of the objective ships and aircraft and vehicles and
men into a set of measurements of Soviet capabilities to




VII. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS^THE ASSETS
The naval assets necessary to the Soviet Union for power
projection to "local wars" as defined above fall into four
main categories:
1- The surface combatants.
2. The amphibious ships.
3. Naval auxiliaries and merchant ships, and
4. Scviet Naval Infantry troops and equipment.
A- TEE SOBFACE COMBATANTS
The surface ship building programs in the Soviet Union
have been subject to a tremendous volume of analysis en
various levels, but cur intention here is rather modest. 28
He will examine a snapshot of the Soviet Navy as it exists
in the Fall of 1983 with an eye to what these ships hav= to
effer to the Eskadra commander tasked with supporting an
intervention far from home. That is, traditional measures
such as displacement tonnage are not as important as the
type and amount of ordnance that can be applied, in a timely
way, tc the target that has been defined. Endurance, for
which displacement is a pretty good indirect measure, is
considered important, but at a certain point it is the
support forces that define the limitations in this area as
well as so many others, so when any measure of expendables,
including ammunition, is attempted it is imperative that the
supply lines be considered. We will begin with narrative
descriptions of some of the larger ships, concentrating on
28 A comprehensive analysis .of Soviet ships and naval
weapons keyed to production decisions throuah 1969 appears
in HccGwire's article "The Structure of the Scviet Navy" in
[Ref. 19: pp. 151-162].
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the specific capabilities that seem most applicable tc the
requirements for distant interventions.
The "Kiev" class VTOL carrier is the largest combatant
ship ever built in the Soviet Union, at about 43,000 tons.
At the time of her appearance in 1976 there was a flurry of
public speculation about the likely missions for which she
might have been designed. As a unique departure for the
Soviets intc fixed- wing avaition at sea, 29 consideration was
given tc the obvious possibility that she was designed tc
carry out the same missions that western carriers do. But
the ship is dramatically different from the large carriers
in the U.S. fleet, in that it has such limited aviation
capability and such traditional Soviet cruiser armament as
the lcng-range SS-N-12 anti-ship cruise missile and two
complementary surface-to-air missile systems, the medium
range SA-N-3 and the short-range SA-N-4. It is also armed
with anti-submarine rcckets, torpedoes, 76mm guns, and a
series of anti-missile gatl ing guns. None of these things,
with the exception of a similar gatling gun system that has
been recently added, are found on U.S. aircraft carriers.
Their functions are carried out by the combined firepower of
the embarked airwing and the other ships in the battlegroup.
The Soviets, then, essentially put a small battlegroup worth
of capability aboard each of these ships, either because the
airwing was going tc consist of a dozen rather unsophisti-
cated airplanes, or because the battlegroup was not going to
exist in the sense that it does in western fleets, or both.
But this assumes that the Soviet intention was to use the
ships for the same purposes that a battlegroup is designed,
and the more sophisticated analysts realized that there was
no reascn tc believe that this was so.
29The Fcrger, discussed below, is the only fixed-wing
(as opposed to rotary-wing, or helicopter) aircraft carried
by the Kiev ships.
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A currently popular choice for the mission of the Kiev
ships (there are three hulls currently active, with the
fourth fitting out) is the protection of Soviet ballistic
missile firing submarines in wartime. 3 ° The missile armament
seems appropriate to the task, certainly, as a significant
part of the threat to the SSBNs resides in the land and
sea-based anti-submarine aircraft and the ASW capabilities
of the carrier and her escort ships. Defeating American
submarines, which are perhaps the greatest single threat to
the Soviet subs, involves using the on-board torpedo and
depth-bomb weapons, probably as a last ditch self-defense
measure, and the coordinated ASW capabilities of a surface
task group and a large number of attack submarines. Large
anti-submarine ships were being built at this time, as we
will see below, as were the needed attack submarines. Tc
make this plan work, Kiev had to have a very sophisticated
command-and-control system, and one was installed. So the
SSBN protection mission seems well considered, but not
related to the problem of intervention.
Nevertheless the capabilities built in, for whatever
reason, are applicable to the intervention mission if the
overriding requirement for SSBN security can be met in seme
ether way, or if the threat is considered low enough to
permit the ships to be otherwise engaged. Specifically, the
weapons designed to be used against an American threat to
the submarine bastions are equally effective against U.S.
ships and submarines headed for the site of a planned Soviet
intervention. Looking ashore, the cruise missiles and even
the SAfls could provide spectacular and intimidating (if
innacurate and expensive) bombardment weapons in their
secondary modes of operation. The 76mm guns (about 3-inch)
have fairly short range and little penetrating power against




a fortified coastline, but with explosive shells and prox-
imity ci VT fuzing, could be very effective against
personnel and light defenses.
The Forger is so inadequate a design that no ons seems
to consider it odd fcr the only fixed- wing aircraft or. the
only fixed-wing "ASW" carrier to have no par-icuiar capabil-
ities against submarines. This may be because it has no
discernable strengths either.
Forger suffers seme dreadful design deficiencies rela-
tive even to the British Harrier, which also emerged from
early 1960s technology. The primary difference is the
Soviet failure, even to this day, to - build a high-bypass
turbofan engine. Tie Harrier flies with a single Pegasus
engine of this type while the Forger uses three smaller,
less efficient engines, two of which are vertically
installed lift-only engines that must be turned off in hori-
zontal flight. The inefficiency of hauling two unused jet
engines around is obvious and it results in severe restric-
tions on range and payload. An obvious mission given these
restrictions is as a fighter in the immediate vicinity of
the ship, and the aircraft dees indeed carry infrared guided
air-tc-air missiles 31 (there is no fire control radar
aboard, so radar guided missiles cannot be used) . This
extends the air defense range of the ship beyond the SA-N-3
range, tut not as auch as cne might hope, and the Fcrger
cannot fight an air-torair battle with a true tactical
fighter in any case. The reason for this is that the
Eritish Harrier, which was quite successful in tactical
engagements against the Argentines, uses the vectorable
engine nozzles in flight tc achieve maneuvers that no
conventional aircraft can match. The Forger design almost
3*A photograph of a Forger carrying what appears to be




certainly dees not permit the pilot to control his thrust
directicr relative to the airframe for tactical purposes.
Of what use, then, is an airplane that can deliver only
two weapons of any size over a short distance? If these two
weapons are anti-radiation missiles, and the anti-air threat
is from surface-to-air missiles near the beach rather than
from tactical fighters, then a limited capability to carry
cut what the U.S. Navy calls the IRON HAND mission, or SAM
suppression, exists. And a Forger with air-to-air missiles
is perfectly capable of shooting down large, unmaneuverable
aircraft such as transports and larger bombers. The capa-
bility tc intimidate all but tactical military air traffic
is not inconsiderable.
Among the large combatant ships that were built at
roughly the same time as Kiev are the "Kara" and "Kresta II"
class ASH cruisers. These ships are nearly identical in
weapons and electronics, the primary difference being in
their propulsion systems; the Kresta II has a conventional
steam plant, indeed a recycled hull design, while the Kara
was a new hull with gas-turbine power. 32 Kara was, until the
American Spruance ships appeared, in a class by herself as
the largest gas turbine ship in the world. The weapons
aboard these ships include the SS-N-14 anti-submarine
missile, torpedoes, SA-N-3 SAMS, and either 57mm (on Kresta
lis) or 76mm guns. The Kara also has the SA-N-4 point
defense aissile. The value cf these ships to the task of
protecting the SSBN bastions in concert with the Kiev has
already teen discussed. It is interesting to compare, as we
32This is an interesting example of one important
element in the conservatism of Soviet design practices.
Although they had proven the value of gas-turbine power in
large ships by pioneering the concept with the "Kashin"
class destroyers, at the time it was decided to build
cruisers with the Kara/Kresta II weapons suite, the notion
was sufficiently radical, and the mission sufficiently
important, to require that a proven hull and power plant be




do in Tafcle V, the considerable overlap in the capabilities
of these ships when compared to the Kiev. When the common
weapons systems are subtracted out, we see the true value of
the Kiev in a Kiev/Kara/Kresta II battle group, and what
would be required to replace her in that function. Clearly,
the common systems are mostly self- protection systems, which
makes sense in a dispersed wartime formation when mutual air
defense is most difficult. The interesting result of the
subtraction is to note that the contribution of the Kiev to
the protection of the SS EN bastions lies in the Forger
(which can perform Banned reconaissance and perhaps shoot
F-3 Crion anti-submarine aircraft flying out of Iceland), in
the SS-N-12 anti-ship missile, and perhaps in the command
and control suite. For these who insist that the Kiev is
essential to this mission of bastion protection,
we will offer below a list of new ships that seem entirely
capable of carrying cut these same missions.
TABLE V
Kiev In a Cruiser Task Force
£i£2 Kara Kresta II Kiev unique
SA-N-3 SA-N-3 SA-N-3 No
SA-N-4 S2-N-4 No No
76mm 76mm 57mm No
Gat Gat Gat No
Helos Helo Helo No
Sonar Sonar Sonar NO
ASW Rocket SS-N-14 SS-N-14 Kiev lacks
SS-N-12 No No Yes
Fcrger No No Yes
CmdSCtl Probably Less Maybe
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Eefore we proceed, though, a few moments should be spent
on the two "Moskva" class helicopter cruisers, which
appeared in 1968 and 1969. They were extremely innovative
designs that anticipated most of the new aspects cf the
Kiev, tut they have teen judged as failures by many and have
certainly net seen a great deal of open ocean use by the
Soviets. Moskva and her sistership Leningrad were prohably
designed to serve the anti-SSEN function in the Norweigian
Sea and Eastern Mediterranean but became obsolete in that
role when longer-range U. S. SLBMs permitted more remote
American submarine deployments [fief. 23: p. 130]. Moskva
was the first ship tc carry the SA-N-3 -SAM, and it also has
57mm guns and ASM weapons. Her air arm is all helicopters.
The cbvicus differences from Kiev, then, are an inferior
self-defense capability, the lack of the Forger, and the
absence cf the long-range anti-ship missile. There may also
be a seaworthiness problem that would have contributed to
the abandonment of the design [Ref. 24: p. 510].
At the same time that the anti-submarine combatant
designs were getting all the new construction money, a
smaller but still considerable force of anti-shipping
cruisers existed, having been built in the 1960s. The
"Kynda" and "Kresta I" classes were designed around the
SS-N-3 icng-range cruise missile, and four were built of
each class. Kynda carries eight ready cruise missiles and
eight relcads, which is a tremendous amount of firepower due
to the large size of the missiles. She has only cne
launcher for the short-range, obsolete, SA-N-1 SAM. Kresta
I mounts four SS-N-3 cruise missiles and two SA-N-1
launchers. This pair of designs tnus illustrates an element
in the Soviet theory of self-defense at sea that applies
across the board: the best defense is a good offense. That
is, an inferior SAB system can be to a degree compensated
for if there is a 250 nautical mile circle around the ship
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within which a hostile unit (carrier or cruise missile
shooter) is in mortal danger. If the hostile aircraft
carrier is to stay outside this ring, threatening carrier-
torn€ tactical bombers are guaranteed to be at cr near
maximum range, where their time on station is severely
restricted. In such a situation, more aircraft are needed
to achieve continuous coverage, and for practical purposes,
with more than one nissile ship, a limit is soon reached.
Eeside this so-called "force multiplier" effect is the
simple reality that in order to maintain surveillance and
conserve fuel at the ragged edge of a jet aircraft's range,
it must fly high and slow, thus making it a much simpler
fire ccntrol problem for the SAM, and a target that can be
hit by a less sophisticated system. So a relatively smaller
number of these ships was needed as compared to the ASW
ships, and less sophisticated air defense weaponry was
required.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a whole new genera-
tion of ships that fits into this large destroyer and
cruiser size category has begun to emerge from the Soviet
shipyards. They are, to a more striking degree than ever,
divisible into anti-submarine oriented ships and cruise
missile strike ships. Each is equipped with a new tech-
nology surface to air missile suite and, interestingly, with
new gun systems that feature relatively large bore weapons
with a high rate of fire.
The most spectacular of the new units is the large
nuclear-powered strike cruiser Kirov, which displaces about
28,000 tons full lead. She is the largest non-carrier
combatant built by any navy since the second World War. The
second of the series is now fitting out. In addition to a
complete command and control suite, Kirov is fitted with the
most advanced missile systems and a sophisticated ASW capa-
bility. Her air defense centers around the long-range
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SA-N-6 SAM, to which the closest American analog is the
Fatrict irissile. This may be the most sophisticated SAM at
sea anywhere. For close-in air defense the short range
SA-N-4 and the multiple gatling guns are installed. The
lcng range cruise missile is the new SS-N-19, whose range at
least matches the 250* nautical miles of the Kiev's SS-N-12.
There are, presumably, other improvements as well in this
system, tut the most readily apparent boost in capability is
the presence of 20 nissiles, in well-shielded launching
positions, ready tc fire at any given moment. Kiev had
eight missiles ready to fire in vulnerable above-deck
launchers, and reloads that wculd have to be hoisted one at
a tine intc position using a cumbersome crane and elevator
system. The ASW araament cf the ship includes the SS-N-14
missile, which is the Soviet's front line anti-submarine
weapon, a variable-depth trailing sonar, and several ASW
helicopters of the new Helix type. This ship is, in every
measure that applies to the submarine bastion support
mission, superior to the Kiev ships. The only "deficiency"
is the atser.ee of Forger aircraft, which, in this role, have
enly a limited air defense function that is more than
compensated for by the SA-N-6. The real sacrifice is in
manned surveillance, which might be better done with shore-
cased or even space-tased platforms in any case.
The modern ASW platform cf the eighties appears to be
the new "Udaloy" class, which is in rapid series production.
As previously mentioned, a new SAM is aboard, although
little is known about the "SA-N-8" for which only weapons
silos and unoccupied radar positions have been identified.
It is prcbably a point defense missile system [ Ref . 24: p.
518]. Lcng range air defense will be provided by the SA-N-6
platfcrms in the battlegroup. Otherwise, Udaloy's armament
is purely ASW oriented, including the SS-N- 14 and a hangar
capable of accomodating two Helix helicopters. The
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difference between two Helix helicopters and the single
Hormones fcund on Kara and Kresta II is the difference
tetween a nearly continuous localization and targeting capa-
bility against submarines out to at least the range of the
SS-N-14, and a maintenence- limited quick reaction helicopter
that ielies much more on other sensors and platforms, and
luck, to find the enemy submarine in the first place. It is
a dramatic improvement and there are already nearly as many
Ddalcy units at sea and under construction as there were in
the entire Kara program.
The Kircv/Udaloy fcattlegroup, then, more than replaces
the Kiev/Kara/Kresta II formation on a- ship-for-ship basis.
And there will apparently be comparable numbers of these
ships except for the Kirov, whose final number may be fewer
than the four Kievs.
Two ether shipbuilding programs are of special interest,
then, because the ccntext we have developed indicates that
they are replacing, cr, more likely considering the Soviet
reluctance to scrap ships, augmenting, the old "Kynda" and
"Kresta I M classes cf cruise-missile strike ships. It is
here that the greatest gains, both in modernity and in
number, can be made.
The larger of the new strike snips is referred to as the
Slava 33 class or, in the 0. S. Department of Defense publi-
cation The Soviet Threat, as the "Krasina" class.
Displacing about 13,000 tons she is considerably larger than
the 9,600 ton Ticonderoga, which is the largest American
cruiser under construction. Slava carries the long range
SA-N-6 SAM and sixteen SS-N-12 cruise missiles in armored
launchers, ready to fire. There is also the multiple
close-in defensive weapons suite and a complete command and
"Previously called BLK-COM-1, for "Black Sea combatant
ship number 1", an accounting shorthand used by the western
fowers to refer to a Soviet ship that has not yet emerged
rom the building yards or been given a class name..
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control capability [ Bef . 25: p. 110]. Three of these ships
are in various stages of preparation for operations, and
because that seems tc be an anomalous number on which to
conclude a building program, there may be more built in the
future.
The ether very large building program that seems to have
begun is the "Sovremenny" class guided missile destroyer. 34
Sovremenny is not test understood within the limitations
imposed ty the comparative arguments we have used here. As
mentioned above, the 1960s strike cruisers achieved a
defactc air defense capability by the capacity tc lob an
SS-N-3 out to 250nm. The most dramatic improvements in
Soviet technology since these ships were designed and built,
though, have been in the area of air defense systems, from
the very clcse-in gatling guns tc the very long range SAMs
of the 1980s. Sovremenny carries a new medium range SAM,
the SA-N-7, which seems to have a good capability against
tactical targets, as well as further close-in defensive
systems. 35 Cruise missile armament, then, need not provide
34Thcugh called a destroyer, this ship is larger than
either of the cruiser classes (Kresta I or Kynda) that it
could be considered to be replacing. The cruiser/destroyer
distinction has outlived its usefulness and is avoided here
as much as possible.
35The great hidden improvement provided by this new SAM
as well as the SA-N-6 is their target handling capacity.
Until the appearance cf phased-array fire control radars for
missiles (marked by the advent of the SA-N-6 for the
Soviets) the number of targets per SAM was equal tc the
number or radars to guide the missiles. Another traditional
limitation was the speed of the missile rail that mounted
and fired the actual weapon. Kirov's design, as well as
Slava*s, puts the missiles in vertical silos and, of course,
uses phased-array technology to permit several simultaneous
target engagements per radar. Sovremenny and the SA-N-7 use
a high-speed single arm launcher that is similar to the cne
used ty the new American "Perry" class frigates. To achieve
multiple-target handling capability they simply installed
six widely separated fire control radars around the super-
structure of the ship. This is a classic Soviet-style solu-
tion tc the problem, because they achieve relatively high
improvement in performance with a relatively low level of
technclogical risk. It also occurs simultaneously with a




the very lcng range buffer zone, especially if there is a
Kirov cr Slava around serving this function anyway.
Until the advent cf the anti-ship Tomahawk there was no
western cruise missile with the very long range required to
accrue the air defense gains tnat the Soviets enjoyed.
Western naval air defense, provided by fighter aircraft and
superior SAMs, did not require it. But western cruise
missiles were being fcuilt, with other capabilities that the
Soviet nissiles could not match. These missiles were
smaller, faster, and they flew in lower to the ocean— all
qualities that improved the ir likelihood of penetrating even
the sophisticated Scviet anti-missile defense systems.
Further, western ships, especially American combatants,
regan arning themselves to defeat the large Soviet missiles
with pre-emptive systems and clcse-in gatling guns cf their
cwn.
The Scvremenny has installed aboard her a new cruise
missile, the SS-N-22, that is probably much more like the
supersonic sea-skimming missiles that the French have been
turning cut for years [Ref. 23: p. 367]. She also carries
two mounts for a new rapid fire 130mm gun that is the
largest gun installed aboard a Soviet ship since the
WWll-technology Kotlir gun cf the 1950s.
Scvremenny, then, seems to represent a departure from
the pattern of ship designs and capabilities that has devel-
oped over thirty years. The role of the 1960s strike
cruisers, to give lcng range striking power (and the conse-
quent air defense advantages) to a formation centered on a
Sverdlov or a Moskva, became obsolete as the Kiev and Kirov
and new the "Slava" classes ccme on line with their cwn lcng
range missiles and improved air defense. Given the capabil-
ities of these new ships a group commander would still
certainly choose a Sovremenny over a Kresta-I if simple
replacement were the choice. But this new ship, especially
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in th€ large numbers that seem to be under construction,
offers the possibility of using the cruise missiles in a
purely offensive context that has never been possible
before. In the early 1980s, as the four Kievs, at least two
Kirovs, and at least three Slavas become operational,
tattlegrcups built around any one or two of these ships, and
including the improved ASW destroyers such as the "Udaloy"
class, the bastion defense mission will be so dramatically
tetter served that it seems possible to imagine, in a rela-
tively calm strategic environment, that a surface force of
some might could be assembled for a third-world support
mission. Adequate ready forces near the bastion areas could
te maintained in case of emergency, or to prevent an
increased American threat from forcing the immediate call-
hack of the expeditionary force. The capacity of the Soviet
Navy to support interventionary forces deployed out of area
will not te limited ty lack of surface ships for a "non-
strategic" mission.
Two important elements in the equation have net been
dealt with at all here. The most obvious and important is
the sutmarine question. The reason for omitting this force
from consideration here is that ^he force most likely to
deploy cut of area for political intimidation purposes has
historically been sutmarines. Our purpose here is to demon-
strate that Soviet ravai f crces are or will imminently be
capable of long out of area surface deployments to support
Soviet military goals. The case for submarines is taken to
have been demonstrated historically, and to be still mere
likely as the submarine force improves at least as dramati-
cally as the surface force.
The ether omission is the absance of speculation about
the nature and capabilities of the hotly anticipated new
Soviet conventional take-off and landing aircraft carrier.
It is believed here that such a program is underway, but
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that the extreme complexity of the task of operating a ship
and airwing of the western type will preclude any opera-
tional capability for the first of these ships before the
late 1990s. We will therefore consider this a matter still
to be speculated upcn, and likely with better sense, in
about ten years.
B. TEE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
The Soviet force of amphibious ships has far less lift
capacity than the force that could be mounted by the U.S.
Navy to support and transport the Marine Corps. The Soviets
show little inclination to threaten the U.S. with a massive
buildup; no major improvements seem to be on the horizon
since the second "Ivan Rogov" class LPD appeared. So the
long range intervention mission, for which this force was
not designed and is not well equipped, suffers some limita-
tions in this area, though we will see that they are net as
great as one might imagine before transcending the purely
mirror-imaged comparison with U.S. forces.
The Ivan Ho gov IPD (dock landing ship) is by far the
largest amphibious ship in the Soviet inventory, at about
13,000 tons. ihen she appeared the size and design r^pre^
sented such a dramatic leap in capability that it was
tempting to speculate that the long-range intervention
mission in the American sense had become a priority for the
U.S.S.B. Only the slew progress on the second unit and the
apparent conclusion of the program at that point has led
many experts to ultimately reject this notion, for she is a
very capable ship. The primary lift capability is for one
Naval Infantry Battalion, 36 which consists of about 409
3*Most information relating directly to the particulars
of Soviet Naval Infantry manpower, equipment, training, or
tactics comes from [ Bef . 26]. Jane's and Polmar were also
very valuable sources, and where~*conrTicts were encountered,
a compromise or consensus figure was given, leaning to the
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personnel with 34 cf the ETR 60PA amphibious personnel
carriers and other equipment. 37 Rogov can beach herself like
any conventional tank landing ship, but with three to five
Hormone transport helicopters aboard for vertical transport,
and two "Lebed" class air cushion vehicles for fast seaborne
irovement, the option of staying offshore with such a
valuable unit is very attractive. The Lebed is an 85 ton
craft capable of transporting one or two PT-76 light tanks
at over 50 knots, ever the top of most conventional beach
obstacles and mines, and even up the beach itself to a
protected position before unloading. A T-54/55 tank is too
heavy and cannot be accommodated by the Lebed, so if Rogov
is to carry them the ship must beach and use its bow doers.
Other important attributes of the Ivan Rogov "class" are
the sophisticated command and control capability that
permits her to direct the landing, a 122mm rocket launcher
and a 76mm gun to prcvide fire support, and self defense
against air attack that includes an SA-N-4 launcher and sets
cf paired gatling guns. Her range is estimated at
10-12, OOOnm at 12 knots, and Rogov has transferred from the
Ealtic to the Pacific fleets and back in recent years.
The other long range amphibious ship in the Soviet
inventory is the Alligator, which has a range of 6,000nm at
16 knets (14,000 at 10 knots). There are 14 of these 4500
ton tank landing ships, each of which can carry 1500-1700
tons of eguipment, including a mix of up to 30 vehicles or
300 men. Their equipment includes a 15 ton crane and one or
conservative side of capability estimates more often than
not.
37 An SNI regiment includes a tank battalion, which is
equipped with 10 of the 36 metric ton T-54/55 medium tanks
and 3l of the smaller 14 ton PT-76 amphibious tanks. All
this heavy equipment will not go aboard an Ivan Rogov at
once, so only an infantry battalion would fit aboard intact,
but if other amphibious ships are around to supplement the
force as many as 20 tanks can be carried by Rogov, along
with men and other equipment.
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two five-ten cranes, as well as a 57mm gun and rocket
launchers. The DIA notes that ZSU 23-4 and SA-9 anti-
aircraft weapons have been observed positioned on deck to
augment the ships organic air defenses. 38 Alligators regu-
larly operate in the Mediterrenean, off West Africa, and in
the Indian Ocean with SNI troops embarked.
Since 1975, sixteen Sopucha LSTs have entered service.
They continue to emerge from Gdansk shipyard in Poland at a
rate of about two per year. Each can carry about 1000 tons,
including about 225 tc 275 troops and some vehicles, though
not the 25 or so APCs this would account for. Thus, as
Jan e j s points out [ Bef . 24: p. 543], the high trccp-to-
vehicle ratio complements the opposite condition found on
the Alligator LSTs. Though the rangs figure published is
3500nm at 16 knots (or 6000nm at 12), with proper replenish-
ment these 3400 ton ships should be able to accompany
Alligators as necessary on worldwide deployments.
Stepping down a rung, there is the 50 or so units of the
"Polnccny" class, but at about 1000 tens, and with a range
of only 3300nm, they will net be considered likely candi-
dates for cut cf area deployment.
Another small ship, though, that deserves consideration
is the "Aist" class air-cushion vehicle. It displaces 220
tons and can carry up to 70 tons, including a medium tank
and 220 troops, or four PT-76 light tanks and 150 troops,
lop speed is about 65 knots and two 30mm cannon are mounted
forward. This craft cannot be carried by any naval amphib-
ious ship, but as we will see, could be useful if trans-
ported out cf area by a merchant barge carrier. There are
thirteen in the inventory. Another possible candidate for
38These are, respectively,. mobile, gun and infrared
missile systems that together rorm the air defense battery
that is a part of every Naval Infantry Regiment. This
particular incident was previously mentioned in section V.
D. 3., the case study of the Angolan intervention of 1975-6.
91

merchant delivery is the 27 ton Gus air-cushion craft, A
pure troop carrier, it can transport about 25 infantrymen
and their equipment up to 230nm a- cruising speed, or at up
to 58 knots for shorter dashes. There are over 33 of these
craft spread through the Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea
Fleets.
C. AUXILIABIES AND MERCHANT SHIPS
An often cited limitation on the general capability of
the Soviet military to operate out of area is the lack of
basing facilities on foreign soil and the relative paucity
of naval auxiliaries to fill in for this apparent gap.
Although Admiral Gorshkov evinces a somewhat wistful tone as
he does it, he, along with the rest of the Soviet military
and political elite, take active prida in the fact that they
need no rases overseas:
"...reports periodically appearing in the Western press
on the presence of certain naval bases belonging to the
USSE on the territories of countries friendly to us are
patently defamatory, seeking to conceal and justify the
efforts of the imperialist powers to extend their mili-
tary rases in many areas of the world. ...a Leninist
peace-loving foreign policy is not after such
acquisitions." [fief. 5: p. 180]
What he is not suggesting, though, is that Soviet foreign
policy dees not reguire a strong overseas presence of Soviet
ships. On the contrary, long and distant deployments are
necessary, and the logistical problems inherant are solved,
he states in the same paragraph, "with the aid of
engineering-tech rical and design solutions" rather than
bases. The facts are, of course, that when naval facilities
can be arranged in critical overseas areas such as Egypt or
Vietnam, they are, for as long as the host country can
tolerate the arrangement. It is also worth pointing out
here that while overseas basing initiatives have been
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pursued mere aggressively than ever since the statement
above was published, the "engineering-technical" sciutiens
have net followed the predictable course of building a large
number cf dedicated naval auxiliaries and large amphibious
ships.
Earr of the appearance cf low lift capacity derives from
the problem of mirror-imaging their military tanker fleet
against cur own, when theirs is designed for different
committments and deployment practices. Another is the
difficulty of approximating the wartime surge capacity
available in the merchant tankers and other auxiliaries that
routinely, even in peacetime, are used to replenish naval
combatant ships operating overseas. 39 This latter area
represents a significant part of the technical solution that
the Soviets are attempting.
The naval auxiliary fleet, like the amphibious fleet,
features a spectacular artifact of the late 1970s that
demonstrates a Soviet interest in overseas operations, but a
lack cf fellow-through in the construction phase. Here we
refer to the "Berezina" class AOR, which at 40,000 tons full
load is by far the largest ship in the naval auxiliary
fleet. Among the reasons that she attracted attention was
the installation of an SA-N-4, two 57mm guns, four gatling
guns, and even two ASW rocket launchers and a hull mounted
sonar on this ship just as the rest of the auxiliary fleet
was having its armament removed. This remains anomalous,
but the Eerezina deserves attention simply on her merits as
a replenishment ship. Approximately 16,000 tons of fuel oil
and deisel, 500 tons of fresh water, and 2-3000 tons of
provisions, munitions, and spare parts are carried. There
are refueling stations on each side and astern, as well as
39The general capability of the Soviet Merchant Marine
as well as the auxiliary forces to support the navy is
considered in some detail in [Bef. 27].
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solid stores transfer rigs port and starboard. Significant
for their ncvelty in the Soviet fleet are the helicopter pad
and twc-Hcrmone hangar for vertical replenishment, and the
apparent presence of excess berthing space that could be
used fcy turnover crews or troops to be sent ashore.
Vertical replenishment is more important than it might seem
at first glance because it has traditionally been in the
area cf solid stores transfer that Soviet auxiliaries have
lagged behind western techniques, and in the specific
category of weapons transfer at sea, there is no reference
available that describes the Soviet Navy actually doing
this. Vertical replenishment is probably the safest and
most efficient way tc transfer weapons, so the Eerezina
provides two helicopters for this purpose where before the
naval replenishment fleet had none.
The next largest auxiliary is the "Boris Chilikin" class
AOR, cf which there are six subordinated to the Navy. These
are 24,000 ton ships with about 20% less payload than
Berezina across the board, and of course no helicopters or
extra berthing. Other significant auxiliaries with inter-
continental range include the "Dubna," "Olekma," "Kazbek,"
"Uda," and "Altay" classes. Each is capable of underway
replenishment of at least liquids. The 62,000 ton Sofia is
a small supertanker that is used in the Indian Ocean to
refuel ether tankers that then disperse to refuel comba-
tants. There are also, of course, many auxiliaries used for
replenishment of previsions, refrigerated stores, dry
stores, etc.
Before we turn tc the merchant ships, there are several
ship types whose imaginative use could contribute signifi-
cantly tc an out of area naval adventure. The two "Ob"
class hospital ships that were built in Poland in the late
1970s and recently became operationally available have
cbvicus utility when the fighting actually begins. They are
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11,000 ten vessels with seven operating rooms each and as
many as 500 beds in their hospital facilities. Each also
has a hangar for the Hormone C that would be used to trans-
port casualties or whatever ether cargo needed to be flown
from ship tc ship or ship to shore. Ob herself is based in
the Pacific Fleet and Yene sey in the Baltic. Transit to the
scene of an amphibious operation would probably not see the
500 beds empty, especially in an amphibious force ocly
recently building enough berthing space for the Naval
Infantry trcops needed to operate the equipment that can be
carried. *o Another interesting group of ships is the missile
range instrumentation ships used to monitor missile tests
and space flights. Each of the eight "Vytegrales, " two
"Desna," and four "Sabir" class ships has a helicopter pad
and air search radars for early warning against air attack
if that role becomes more appropriate than missile tracking.
Fishing fleet factory ships are not only an obvious source
of canned tuna, but each also represents another transport
helicopter and landing pad at sea.
As ncted earlier, any distinction between naval auxili-
aries and "civilian" merchantmen in the Soviet Union is
purely administrative, and if the British can mobilize
privately cwned ships as quickly as they did for the
Falklands campaign, one is tempted to suspect that the
Soviets would have little difficulty redirecting their
assets in a similar way. With this in mind, and the amphib-
ious possibilities fcremost, the editors of Janets include a
category called "Auxiliary Amphibious Ships," which they
introduced in 1983 with the following note:
QJane's also points out that the Soviet Onion has the
world* s~Tafc est passenger fleet cf about 500.000 tons, which
could, if called upon, transport about 40,000 troops at once





years by a similar expansion in
specialist tonnage of types directly of value to naval
support or amphibious activities. The integrated
command structure controlling all merchant ship activi-
ties, which has naval staff at each separate 'company'
office and a cere cf naval personnel on each ship, has
for many years enabled individual merchant ships, espe-
cially tankers, to be rerouted from normal commercial
trading to act as fleet support ships.... By 1984, four
large rarge carriers will be in service, with a further
five smaller ships (the new Vaimet feeder ships and the
three 'Stakhanovets* class) being able to operate as
LPEs.... This is exactly the type cf amphibious capa-
bility that would be essential in any future conflict.
The ships would reguire little or no modification before
being employed in a military role." [fief. 24: p. 545]
The largest of the the four barge
.
carriers referred to
by Jane* s are the Alekse^y Kosygi n and the similar sized but
nuclear powered unit under construction in the Black Sea.
Each displaces ever 60,000 tens and has a 500 ton gantry
crane fcr handling LASH type barges or most other cargo
carrying platforms that can operate out cf the back of a
ship. Either of these units could transport and deploy
several cf the 2 20 ten "Aist" class air cushion vehicles.
There are also two "Yulius Euchik" type barge carriers
in the Scviet inventory which are about the same size as the
LASH carriers. They might be even better suited to the air
cushion vehicle mothership role, as each has a barge
elevator on its stern which is capable of hoisting two 1300
ton SEEBEE 41 barges at once. Admiral Gorshkov singles cut
these American-designed ships for specific mention in
Seapower , noting that each is "...capable of carrying a
motorized rifle brigade. .. .the troops (of which) may be
iSEEBEE barges are 38X11 meters each, making the
elevator at least 38X22 meters. Lebed ACVs. at 25X11 meters
would fit neatly, even two at once. Aist ACVs are 47X17
meters, which suggests that there would be some overhang if
they were placed on the elevator, similar to the overhang
observed when tactical aircraft are lifted on deck-edge
elevators aboard U.S. aircraft carriers. A fully leaded
Aist would not weigh even ten percent of the lift capacity
of the elevator. Some of this data is found in [Ref. 28].
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landed on a poorly-equipped shore." 42 All these ships have
ranges of at least 12,000 miles. The five smaller baige
carriers mentioned are capable of accommodating "Lsbed" or
"Gas" class ACVs.
More traditional, if less spectacular methods of getting
ashore involve simply driving an amphibious vehicle cut of a
ship directly into the water and to the beach. (As we noted
before, all the vehicles used by the Soviet Naval Infantry,
with the exception cf the medium tanks, are amphibious) .
Eeter Hertel Rasmussen points out [fief. 20: p. 154] that
civilian RO-RO ships have been observed disgorging amphib-
ious vehicles during exercises in the Baltic. Since 1975
the Soviets have added at least 40 RO-RO ships of various
sizes to their inventory. Most have been built in foreign
(usually Finnish or Eclish) yards, but Norman Pclmar notes
that cne class was designed and built by the Soviets them-
selves with two 25,000 horsepower gas turbine engines that
produce a top speed cf around 25 knots:
"Apparently the Scviet government felt the need for a
small number of faster container ships, and the Nikolaev
south yard built the 'Kapitan Smirnov 1 class of combina-
tion ccntainer-RORO ships." [Ref. 23: p. 4 15]
The applicability of these attributes to the "rapid-
deployment force" mission speaks for itself. The overall
capacity of the Soviet RORO/LASH fleet is very large, and
will be summed in the context of amphibious assault in the
next chapter.
2 It is worth noting that the. second edition of the book
(1979) gave tne topic of ships with "horizontal loading and
unloadinc facilities" almost twice as many lines as the
first, emphasizing the capabilities of LASH-type ships to
handle "large-size cargoes unsuitable for contamerizaticn"
at high efficiencies and without shore facilities.
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D. TBE SOVIET NAVAL INFANTRY
The number, size, and type of the larger weapons and
vehicles in a regiment of Soviet Naval Infantry is shown in
Table VI. It is assuned that smaller items of gear and mcst
cf the troops will te transported in the vehicles them-
selves, which is the standard practice.
TABLE VI
Soviet Naval Infantry Regiment

































All these vehicles are amphibious with the exception of
the T-54/55 tanks, and the K-61 vehicle can carry either 60
troops cr five metric tons of cargo from a ship to the
beach. Assuming 15% efficiency in vehicle loading we can
add 25% to the deck area taken for each vehicle and multiply
it by the total number of each type for the vehicle leading
area in square meters for an SNI regiment. The figure one
arrives at is 4,817 square meters of deck space used for the
loadinc cf vehicles cnly. Tc be properly conservative we
will round this figure up to 5,000 and double it tc arrive
at a guess as to the square meters of deck space required
for the entire regiment including the equipment that is not
leaded onto the vehicles during the actual transit. Using a
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similar irethcd we arrive at 5,000 metric tons for the weight
of the 10,000 square meters of cargo. The manpower of the
regiment is established by DIA as 2,038 men.
Table VII gives the order of battle of each of the fleet




Soviet Naval Infantry by Fleet
FLEET: NORTHERN BALTIC BLACK SEA PACIFIC












Seme extra attention tc the Pacific Fleet SNI force is
also worthwhile. This has long been a different force from
that present in the other fleets. The unclassified DIA
Defense Intelligence Report [Ref. 26: p. vii ] invites a
raised eyebrow when it introduces the parts and their sum
this way:
"Today the Soviet Naval Infantry numbers about 12 e 000
men. Single naval infantry regiments are stationed in
the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleet areas, and at
least twe regiments with the Pacific Ocean Fleet. Each
regiment is composed of about 2000 men..."
It doesn't quite add up. And the unclassified naval order
of battle used for the figures above gives a total of 13,000
SNI troops in 1982, suggesting that some augmentation is
underway in any case. The defector who calls himself Viktor
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Suvorcv offers an interesting clue in his recent bock I nside
the Soviet Arm y:
"The Soviet Navy has only one brigade of marine
infantry. This belongs to the Pacific Fleet. It
consists of two tark ana five motor-rifle battalions and
is equipped with especially heavy artillery. This
brigade is sometimes mistakenly taken (sic) for two
'.ments of marine infantry." 43independent regi;
If this is so, what impact dees it have on oar calculations?
Suvorcv does not specify whether the tank battalions are
naval infantry type (with mostly amphibious tanks) or the
ground forces type, with medium tanks like the T-72. Since
he calls the organization a brigade, and refers to mctor-
rifle battalions and heavy artillery, none of which are
characteristic of "typical" SNI organization and equipment,
we will assume that the Army units that have these names
provide the best model.
A typical Soviet Motorized Rifle Regiment has three
motorized rifle battalions and one medium tank battalion.
Two of these regiments, obviously, make a force similar to
Suvorova Pacific Brigade. Among the Division level assets
that would be needed to make the brigade autonomous would be
artillery, air defense, and perhaps anti-tank and mortar
groups. Suvorov mentions the artillery, of course,
suggesting that it is the larger 122mm self-propelled
43[Ref. 31: p. 87]. His next paragraph is also inter-
esting: "The Soviet marine infantry has a very promising
future. In the next few years it will receive new types of
eguipment which will enable it to put large units into
action against distant targets. Special combat equipment is
being developed for such operations by the marine infantry."
The type of "equipment" he is referring to is not specified,
but since no large amphibious ships are under construction,
cne wenders if ne means the large "civilian" ships that we
will censider in the next section. or even the Wing In
Ground Effect (WIG) aircraft that Admiral Gorshkov has been
referring to for years. and which might indeed have SNI
transport applications that will be considered below.
44 A11 hard data on the size, configuration. and equip-
ment of Soviet Army units is taken from two unclassified DIA
reports: £Hef- 32], and[Ref. 33].
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amphibious artillery pieces rather than just the mortars and
rockets common tc naval infantry forces. A battalion would
consist of eighteen cf these large weapons. The air defense
battery would consist of four ZSU-23-4 and four SA-9, as it
dees in a standard SSI regiment, or it might include the
fully motile SA-6 that the Soviet Army has at the regimental
level- The amphibious, and lighter ZSU/SA-9 combination
will te assumed, but when this is added to the 64 T-72 tanks
(at HI tens apiece) , 165 BM?s (about 13.5 tons) , 45 cr so
large trucks and other vehicles, and about 2500 men that are
called fcr by the talk and motorized rifle battalions, then
it becomes clear that the Pacific Brigade, if in fact
augmented tc this degree, weighs about 14,000 tons and uses
about 14,000 square meters of deck space. 45
5 The same method as above was used in these calcula-
tions. The large number of tanks and the use of BMPs for
infantry carriers increases the "density" of this type of
brigade considerably over what is normal for a Naval
Infantry regiment. The corresponding figures for two stan-




VIII. AGSJ EDITING THE ASSETS
Sc far the narrative description of Soviet naval assess
for distant intervention has been only partially useful in
determining what the actual capability is. Very much in the
tradition cf writings on this topic, this has been a serial
listing cf the order cf battle in the appropriate categories
with suggestions of hew the particular units might be used.
Ihis is an intuitively understandable, even necessary part
cf the process of understanding, but ultimately insufficient
if the desire is to realistically project what the Soviets
might te able to do in a given situation. In the course of
describing the new Soviet combatant ships, some time was
spent en defining the numbers of large units that are being
built, and for purposes cf this analysis we will net gc much
further than to say that the absolute numbers of these ships
and certainly the overall capabilities are increasing tc the
point that a "secondary" mission such as support fcr Scviet
forces in a non-strategic intervention to actively carry cut
the defense of socialism is well within reach now. The
problems of air defense outside the reach of land-based
tactical aircraft have been dealt with in a "scientific" and
economical way by simply building superior SAMs. For
anything less than a irajor sea battle with large-scale U.S.
naval forces, this is probably adequate. The anti-ship
strike threat is more dramatic than ever now, and can be
offered as a genuinely offensive gesture to even American
naval forces with the expectation that it will be respected.
The ships new exist, cr will very soon, to credibly threaten
severe lesses for any power that would attack a deployed
Soviet amphibious formation, while at the same time
defending the contigucus seas that would be needed as SSBN
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tasticns. The Soviets have a navy that is capable of
carrying out its strategic mission octh offensively and
defensively while deploying operational 46 or tactical fcrces
to any part of the world ocean.
The ether types cf forces, amphibious, auxiliary, and
merchant, can all te considered as elements in the system
for the transportation of supplies and equipment to distant
parts. But in order to operationalize the matter at all,
the specific types of materials that must be transported for
cur purpose have to te related in size, shape, weight, and
guantitiy to the types cf ships available. John A.
Jederlinic and Larry K. Luckeroth note' that the plethcra of
ship types and high degree cf specialization in ship designs
make it:
"...very difficult for the logistics planner to develop
meaningful models because of the difficulty delineating
common denominators by which all ships could be
evaluated." [ Bef . 29]
The problem is one of seeing the forest for the trees, and
their paper offered an improved method of aggregating meas-
ures cf ship usefulness to the tasks of maritime transport
cf military goods. The Jederlinic/Luckeroth method will be
outlined below, but it is worthwhile first to understand the
"select ship concept," upon which their method improves by
expanding versatility and avoiding certain pitfalls of
cversimplif ica t i on
.
46The term "operational" can be misleading to a western
reader when it is used in the context favored by Soviet
military writers. It's meaning falls between what we would
think of as strategic or tactical. A useful guideline is to
think of an operational level activity as one that is
nationally directed and important on a national scale (thus
larger than "tactical") , but not potentially decisive for
national survival. cr the survival of the communist system,
which would be "strategic."
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A. METHODS OF AGGREGATION
The select ship concept simplifies the aggregation
problem ty simply omitting from consideration any ship that
does not meet certain minimum standards of speed, range, and
maximum single boom cargo lift capacity. For the limited
scenario against which it was conceived, which was transoce-
anic administrative sealift by merchant ships in support of
an amphibious operation, it was useful. This is actually
the sort of operation that American or British merchant
ships might reasonably be, and in the case of the Falklands
were, called upon tc carry cut. 3ut traditionally the
Soviet Naval Infantry mission has been defined, at leas- in
the West, as being directed at support of the ground fcrcss
closer tc the forward edge of the battle area, and as a part
cf a larger conflict. Exercises in the Baltic, for example,
are seen as rather direct dress reversals for flanking oper-
ations that might accompany a Soviet thrust across the
Northern Plain of Western Europe, and Hasmussen notes that:
"...the naval infantry of -he Pacific fleet has
conducted a number cf landings in the Kuril Islands. It
is believed that one of their war-time missions would be
to secure these islands by invading them and holding
them against attempts from other Pacific powers tc
occupy them." [Eef. 20: p. 157]
The select ship method is not a good way to define the scrt
cf ships necessary tc carry out such short range, small
scale activities.
Other, more specific objections to the select ship
method include the oversimplification involved in making all
gualifyirg select ships cf egual value for accounting
purposes, and the disgua lificaticn of many very capable
ships fcr failure tc meet a single standard, such as boom
capacity, when it has adequate range and speed and may, in
fact, have an altercate methcd of offloading cargo that is
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even tetter suited to the situation under consideration.
The minimum requirement for boom capacity is generally
pegged tc the weight of a main battle tank, as a defini-
tional type of cargo that must get ashore. Select ships for
transporting U.S. forces would need, then, a 60-ton crane tc
be considered.
The improved Jederlinic/Luckeroth method achieves a
tetter measure by establishing interval scales of:
1
. Deck space. It is presented as a better measure of
military cargc than cubic meters because so much of
the cargo in guestion is outsized, cannot be stacked,
and wastes a great deal of a ship's cubic space.
2. Cargc handling factor. Here a set of regular inter-
vals are choser, descending from the weight of a main
tattle tank, tc measure ton capacity of the largest
crane aboard the ship.
3. Service speed factor. A high tactical transit- speed
for merchant ships is chosen as a floor for the
highest ratings and a series of gradations are
defined down tc the lowest rating, which might repre-
sent a maximum service speed of less than, say, 12
knots.
Ships ratings in each category are taken on a scale of
perhaps one to five, and the ratings are simply summed, and
the resultant for each ship is applied to a fourth, overall
scale, that categorizes ships for their general relative
merits with all factors considered.
Although this method avoids the worst of the disadvan-
tages of the select ship system, which is the total emission
of ships not meeting the standards of a single category, and
it holds up the possibility of changing the standards as
required to measure the ships against a specific scenario,
in the end it offers somewhat less than one might reasonably
hope. At the price of a considerable increase in complexity
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it ultimately offers only a four level aggregate scale in
which each cf the three factors are given equal weight. The
dependence of the select ship measure to the scenario of a
long distance intervention stems only from the use cf a
range cutoff as cne cf the selection criteria, and it is as
easy to change a variable in a modified select ship approach
as it is tc offer a different variable in another system.
The new measure seems to be an improvement of degree rather
than kind, certainly, but dcesn*t ultimately respond to the
real problem of describing adequately the utility of revolu-
tionary new types of ships to the task of supporting amphib-
ious operations.
This analysis is ccncerred specifically with the sort of
situation that the select ship system was designed for, so
the temptation is great to simply proceed with it. But the
challenge laid down ty the analysts cited is a legitimate
one, and it seems tc be manageably simple to devise a meas-
urement that applies to the transfer of Soviet forces over
long distances to land SNI troops and support them.
A modified version of the select ship method will be
suggested then, that specifically considers the ships avail-
able to the Soviet Navy and merchant marine that could
support various levels of intervention in areas distant from
the Soviet fleet areas. This version will be scenario
dependent in the same sense that select ship is prone tc be,
tut the measures of ships required will be defined based
upon a larger sense cf the progress of an intervention as it
might prcceed frcm a small, surprise landing (as was implic-
itly threatened by the Alligator off Guinea in the early
1970s) up through and including the largest scale interven-
tion that the combined forces of the SNI, amphibious-trained
army troops, and other available forces could muster.
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E. LEVEIS CF INTERVENTION
It is difficult fcr Americans to think of an amphibious
operation as anything less than the familiar spectacles of
Inchon or the Pacific Campaign of World War Two. There are
obviously smaller scale actions, and it is the capability to
carry cut several fairly small scale interventions simulta-
neously that distinguishes the United States Marine Corps
from any other naval infantry force in the world. The
Soviets, by designing the Ivan Rogov ships around a capacity
to transport a battalion of SNI, have created a taseiine
definition of what we will here consider the smallest
significant interventionary force. This is not so much to
dismiss as insignificant a force like the pair of Alligators
often seen off the coast of Cyprus as it is to raise the
threshold of what we would choose to call an important new
demonstration of Soviet amphibious capability. The transits
of Rogovs to and from the Pacific demonstrated in a prac-
tical way the feasibility of worldwide movement en this
scale (although it must be noted that the rate of movement
was leisurely and the amphibious landing demonstration
performed fcr the South Yemenis was reportedly uninspiring).
The next level tc be considered is the largest possible
intervention that could be generated with naval and SNI
forces only. That is, naval auxiliaries supporting naval
combatants and amphibious ships with no extraordinary assise
tence frcm the merchant forces and no general mobilization
of ncn-naval forces to assist in the early phases of the
operation.
The third level will be a distant area sea intervention
en the largest scale that the Soviets could possibly muster,
using all naval infantry forces, airborne, and amphibious-
trained Army troops that could be transported.
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The reason for dividing the analysis this way derives
from the cperationalizatio n of material transportation we
introduced above; the measure of the usefulness of a ship
has to be determined by its intended cargo as much as
possible. There are significant departures in the types of
equipment required when each jump in scale is made. For
example, at the level of intervention limited to naval and
SNI forces, the fact that cnly fcur regiments of SNI exist,
and each has only ten medium tanks, suggests that one large
ship with a forty ten crane could handle the lot of them.
That is, given that ship we could let the 20.5 ton weight of
the ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft weapon, which is the next
heaviest single piece of gear, be the limiting factor for
lift capacity, defining what other ships (and cranes) would
te required. But since there are only four of these per
regiment, we could let them ride with the T-54/55 tanks and
take 14 tons, which is the weight of the amphibious PT-76
tank, as the critical level of lift capacity. It is prob-
ably not coincidental that the 14 Alligator LSTs are
equipped with a fifteen-ton crane as their largest lifting
device.
1 • Naval Infantry and Naval Sealif t
The measurements of the ships are not simple to establish,
but Table VIII gives the best approximations available in
open sources. The data for Ivan Rogov is given in the least
convenient units, but we can obviate the awkwardness of this
ty simply subtracting the square meters calculable from
Table VI, using the same formula, and guessing that the ship
can carry at least 2,000 tens if an Alligator can carry
1,700. Thus the Eogcv reduces the remaining regimental lift
requirement to about 3,000 tons, maybe 7,600 square meters,








































The Baltic Flee- order of battle for amphiticus
ships presently includes both of the Ivan Rogcv units, two
Alligator LSTs, and four Rcpucha LSTs. Because of the
presence, at least temporarily, of both Rogcvs,* 7 it seems
lilcely that the regiment of SHI based in this fleet is the
most likely candidate for overseas deployment. So the lift
capacities of the six remaining ships are subtracted from
the regiaental requirements after the loading of the single
available Ivan Rcgov (this, cf course, assumes 100? avail-
ability of the other amphibians, which is impossible navy-
wide, but imaginable for this small number of ships within a
single fleet, raised tc full readiness for a specific, high
priority operation) - Simple subtraction shows that the
requirement for tonnage is met with a considerable margin,
and that further lift capacity is needed only for ancther
1200 square meters of bulk cargo and another 400 troops.
7Tbe original hull is probably involved in a major
overhaul and refit based upon the lessons learned during its
time at sea. The second unit took so long to produce 'that
it was supposed that these lessons were being incorporated
into the A lek sandr Hikolae v while it was in the tuilding
yards. As of"~wintef~T?B4"7 the Nikolae v appears tc be a
likely transfer to the Pacific Fleet."
109

. .. C w-Interest ingly, the Berezina kOB. might meet
requirements by herself. The two most important departures
from normal fleet oiler design that she represents ar = her
relatively larger dry cargo capacity compared to previous
Soviet designs (with improved means of transferring it while
underway) and the "crew" capacity of about 600, which seems
higher than the number needed to man the ship. Tnese capa-
bilities are useful for any number of reasons, including the
transportation of relief crews to distantly deployed units
en routine missions, but they are also very well suited to
the needs of the Baltic Soviet Naval Infantry regiment if it
was to be deployed for a distant intervention. 48 Other auxi-
liaries could perfori the dry cargo part of the mission, and
any of these, combined with either of the "Ob" class
hospital ships, could do the chore as well as 3erezina and
provide the medical care that would be required as well.
So the Baltic regiment seems transportable, but what
are the limits if more than a regiment of SNI are considered
necessary? lable VII provided the order of battle of each
cf the Soviet fleets in SNI related measures. It would seem
initially apparent frcm our calculations that indepe ndent
loveients over large distances are possible on the regi-
mental scale only frcm the Baltic and the Pacific fleets
(for one of the two EflCFLT regiments) .
^ closer lock reveals the ease with which a little
bit cf preparation and asset juggling makes the Soviet Naval
Infantry a threat fcr long range intervention on the regi-
mental scale from any one or maybe two of the fleet areas.
Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of denuding
strategic areas of SNI assets that presumably exist because
48 The Berezina need not be based in the Baltic, and
would net even "lave to stage there, since her cargo would
not necessarily include even vehicles, only dry cargo and
supplies, and the trccps to be transported could be flown in
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they are needed where they are, and continuing to ignore the
"Polnccny" class larding ships because they are too small
for our purposes (even though they are capable of carrying
cut the short range strategic transits), the simple mathe-
matics of transport in the four fleet areas is illustrated
in Table IX. For each fleet, the available transport capa-
bility is calculated, using the order of battle given in
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Table VII, in terms cf tons, square meters, and troops.
(Note that the Baltic is given credit for only one of the
Ivan fioccv units.) The requirements of each fleet to
transport the SNI present there (two regiments in the case
of the Pacific Fleet) is then calculated, and the surplus or
shortfall presented in boldface.
The immediate conclusion from the table is that the
Pacific Fleet has a sericus shortage in bulk transport
capacity and personnel transport, but could probably lift a
14,000 tcn/14, 000 square meter/2500 man "Suvorov brigade"
with the readdition of the Rogov and the use of the
Berezina. Even given the offical two regiments, the heavy
lift capacity seems to be there, and the addition of the
Eogov plus the Berezina and perhaps one of the hospital
ships brings all of the catagories to within striking range
cf requirements given the margin of error in these figures.
Ihe Black Sea Fleet falls short in the area of personnel
transport only, which could be easily made up by one of the
hospital ships or one of the many passenger liners based in
this fleet area. The Northern Fleet has fairly sericus
shortfalls across the board, but its strategic value in
area* 9 makes it the least likely to deploy independently
anyway. The Baltic Fleet has manageably slim shortfalls in
the bulk and personnel categories, as we have mentioned. An
interesting observation can be made with regard to the
Ealtic Fleet. The tctal Soviet order of battle for Ropucha
ISTs is given in the 1983-84 edition of Jan e 1 s as sixteen
ships. The DIA order of battle [Ref. 30] from which the
^Possible wartime roles that are "in area" or our
purposes include seizure of northern Norweigian or even
Icelandic airfields as part an overall war plan for keeping
the Northern Fleet and the SSEN "bastions" secure. If the
Northern Fleet SNI forces are kept in a "war reserve" status
in order to be available for these missions, then they would
not be likely candidates for Third World intervention.
Exercise Zapaa 81 (see below) indicates that any such
reserve status for the SNI or its ships is subject to tempo-
rary modification if it exists at all.
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data in Table VII is taken shows only 14 total Ropuchas,
with fcur of them in the Baltic Fleet. Since the ships are
built in the Baltic at a rate of two par year, it seemed
worthwhile to try the assumption that the ships had been
built and had been assigned to the Baltic Fleer, but that
thay had net yet met the requirements for inclusion in the
BIA crder of battla. The. results are given in parentheses.
These twe Rcpuchas rather neatly close the gap in long-range
lift capability without relying on auxiliaries, hospital
ships, or other sources of lift capacity.
The regiments that seem most likely to be trans-
ported over long distances intact, then, are the Baltic and
the Elack Sea. The anamclous Pacific brigade cannot be
lifted as a unit with local assets, but does have a large
lift capability and could be partially deployed in greater
strength than any of the other fleets. As we will see, the
lack of naval subordinated lift is a constraint that we
impose upon ourselves, and one which the Soviets may not
feel bound by any more than the British did.
Finally, the obvious question of combining elements
of each of the four fleets into one, larger force, rather
than assuming deployments from within a single fleet, must
te dealt with. If there is indeed a strategic, wartime
function for the S NI in the immediate fleet areas that
precludes the wholesale deployment of these forces to
distant waters, then a combined force from all fleets would
be the only way to generate enough strength for a signifi-
cant intervention.
In September 1981 the Soviets used this technique in
an exercise called Zapad 8 1 to land, on the Soviet Baltic
shores, a larger force than they had ever before attempted
in peacetime [ Ref. 34: pp. 232-234]. Over the course of
July and August the reinforcements included two Alligators
from the Elack Sea Fleet, three Ropuchas and two more
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Alligators (carrying tanks) from the Nortnern Fleet, and the
Ivan Eo^ov all the way from the Pacific Fleet. Ultimately,
5000to 6000 SNI troops with 200 medium tanks were assembled
for the exercise. Also present were the Kiev and the
"Moskva" class helicopter cruiser Leningrad, from operations
in the Mediterranean. Hasaiussen points out that these
transits did not denude the Northern Fleet amphibious capa-
bility because the Forty-Fifth Motor Rifle Division from
Murmansk was trained in amphibious operations. As signifi-
cantly, he notes that "sizable parts of the Baltic Sed
Banner Fleet took no part in the exercise." The Baltic
fleet could carry on with its responsibilities independently
of the exercise, if at a somewhat lower level.
The Soviets have demonstrated, then, a capability to
establish a force cf 5000 SNI troops from the different
fleets and to coordinate them in an amphibious landing.
Zapad 81 was not, of course, "far from home" in the sense
that this thesis is considering possible future interven-
tions; it was on Soviet soil. But significant parts of the
amphibious and surface forces used did transit over
distances exceeding those called for by the traditional SNI
mission of securing local fleet areas. Adding up the
combined lift capacity of just the amphibious ships that
transited from another fleet to be present for the exercise
gives a total of over 10,000 tens, 12,000 square meters, and
about 1600 men. If the Baltic Fleet provided two Alligators
and two Eopuchas to an overseas intervention (a proportion
between that offered by the Northern Fleet, which was
denuded cf heavy lift, and the Pacific Fleet) then the
combined lift would be adequate for even a Suvorcv-ty pe,
reinforced naval infartry "brigade."
The larger lesson of Zapad 81 is the willingness of
the Soviets to comtine forces from all services and the
"civilian" shipping sector into a unified task force. The
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physical limits cf this approach for Third World interven-
tion will be discussed in the next section.
2. Com bin ed Forces Interventions
The Zapad 81 combination of naval/ air, and ground
forces is consistent with the current conventional thinking
en the irission of the Soviet Naval Infantry, which holds
that SNI forces secure peripheral areas of the Soviet Union
in a larger war and are followed by a consolidating force of
army trccps, by land or by sea. This "combined arms"
approach tc solving iiilita ry problems is a cornerstone of
Soviet military thinking, and must be considered in this
analysis. Although there are no examples of large-scale
overseas Soviet military actions to draw upon, it seems
reasonable to expect that any future intervention in the
Third World would, tc the extent possible, make use of the
doctrine and skills that have bean developed in exercises
such as Zapad-8 1
.
Soviet Naval Infantry doctrine is expressed within
the larger context cf the role it plays in combined arms
operations including ground fcrces and airborne forces as
well [Bsf. 26: p. 23]. Specifically, the initial landing
should be coordinated with an airborne landing in the enemy
rear area, and SNI involvement ends when the secure beach-
head has permitted the landing of the regular ground forces
that will carry out the larger military objective. At this
point the Naval Infantry forces are actually withdrawn from
the scene cf combat- To begin to understand the actual
limits of intervention on the largest scale reasonable,
then, we must be assured of the capability of the airborne
fcrces tc play an appropriate role and for the ground fcrces
tc be transported in adequate number and by "select ships"




The five phases cf a Soviet amphibious assaul-1-. are
listed below: [Ref. 26: p. 23]
1. Preparation of equipment and amphibious units.
2. Embarkation of personnel and loading of equipment on
ships and transports.
3. Movement by s€a to the objective area.
4. The battle for the beachhead by the amphibious units.
5. Landing of ground forces and withdrawal of the naval
infantry.
The first three of these are relatively straightforward, but
the last two should be developed in further detail before
conclusions can be reached about the number and types of
ships needed for such an assault.
In Soviet doctrine the size of the amphibious force
used to cpen the beachhead of the following ground forces is
dependent upon the type and number of enemy defenses, but
against a defended coastal area a "battalion assault force"
is typical. A battalion, of course, is a small enough force
to he transported irtact en a single "Ivan Rogov" class
ship, but as we have shown above, with purely organic assets
the Soviet Naval Infantry can mount a force several times
this size for overseas deployment.
A typical naval infantry assault begins with shore
bombardment of enemy defenses (naval gunfire and rockets)
combined with tactical air support to assist in the bombard-
ment and to achieve air superiority. Targets ashore would
have been scouted by special forces of either the naval
infantry or the airtcrne forces. Soviet paratroopers (as
few as a company, but as many as needed) drop into the enemy
rear area tc cut lines of communication, secure key terrain,
and disrupt movement of enemy reinforcements. An SNI recon-
naissance platoon eguipped with one PT-76 amphibious tank
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and three BRDMs goes ashore as a group of combat engineers
land by helicopter tc mark and clear -hree lanes for the
bat t alien assault force. 5 ° The reconnaissance plarcon
proceeds inland far enough to direct naval gunfire and
supporting airstrikes against shore defenses. The first
wave cf naval infantry comes ashore in three PT-76s and ten
BTR-60PB armored personnel carriers. These vehicles fire
their main weapons against shcre defenses as they swim in,
then widen the beachhead when they come ashore. The second
wave, similarly equipped, goes ashore in the same manner,
followed by mortar, antitank, and air defense platoons. The
battalion commander gees ashore at this time to take overall
command to the beach as naval gunfire and air support moves
farther inland. The xhird wave lands, as directed by the
commander ashore, and is followed by rear support forces to
establish supply points, etc. The reconnaissance platccn is
at this time establishing contact with the airborne company
that is advancing toward the beachhead. When the routes
inland are cleared and marked, the beachhead secured, and
ground fcrces have relieved the SNI and airborne forces, the
latter are removed.
The scenario above [Ref. 26; pp. 32- 34] by no means
represents the limits of naval infantry employment or
tactics. The Soviets have used air-cushion vehicles, for
example, in amphibious landings and are capable of ether
imaginative tactics as situations call for them. Some of
these will be developed when the capability to circumvent
the limitations of the assault force are considered below.
soit is worth noting that this is the only place in the
DIA "doctrine" that helicopters are required. Exercise
Zapad 81 included 31 helicopters as part of the amphibious
force [fi€f. 3ft: p. 233] and Gorshkov [ fief . 5] specifically
mentions advances that can be made in the use of helicopters
for improved amphibious tactics, so one is well advised not




. jot ential Linitations
Seme areas cf potential difficulty for a Soviet
intervention planner are outlined below:
1. Lack of surprise. A large scale amphibious force
wculd surely be detected by the Hest as it was
fcrming--certainly as it deployed--and the potential
targets wculd probably be few.
2- Air cov er
.
Soviet doctrine for amphibious assault
includes close air support and fighter cover from
tactical aircraft based, obviously, within their own
"combat radius" cf the conflict.
3- Adequacy cf transport capability. The quantitative
capacity of Soviet shipping to transport large
numbers of grcund forces has not been demonstrated
over intercontinental distances. The qualitative
suitability of Soviet ships to actually put ground
fcrces ashore in a range of situations is a non-
trivial problem.
4. Cc mmand and ccntro l . Zapad-81 was directed by the
Minister of Defense, Marshal Ustinov, personally
[Bef. 34: p. 232]. It would be expected that any
large scale intervention would feature multiple,
redundant means of communication with Moscow.
Coordination of airborne, navy, naval infantry, and
grcund forces en a distant site would be especially
difficult.
5 • Spe cif ic Capab ilit ies
Eefore Soviet intervention capabilities are measured
against the limitations noted above, it is worthwhile to
consider what might actually be required in third-world
intervention scenarics that one can imagine. No attempt
will be made to narrcw the measurement to a set of specific
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requirement s that characterize all possible such situations,
fcut one can look back into the historical record for poten-
tial landing scenarios that were noi taken up by Soviet:
forces. The Angolan and Ethiopian interventions, in which
large nunbers of Cuban forces were used, come to mind. In
these cases there was no resistence at the points of troop
debarkation. Options nox exercised in these cases, though,
include flanking assaults against UNITA or Somali positions
which were accessible only by sea. A more fertile line of
speculation is to lcck into the future at potential areas
for Soviet intervention. On the African continent, the
continuing resistence to the MPLA in Angola provides a
possible opportunity for by Soviet intervention. Civil war
in Nigeria or Guinea, war between South Africa and any or
all cf her neighbors are others. In the Far East, conflict
between Vietnam and Thailand cr even the PRC might provide
an opportunity for a demonstration of some kind.
The purpose cf this speculation is to make the point
that there is a level of likely resistence to Soviet inter-
vention in the Third World that falls below that which one
would expect from the NATO countries or Japan. And when
Soviet limitations are considered, this lower level of
resistence reduces the impact of soma of the more obvious
and ccmmcnly reported Soviet deficiencies. Given that the
Soviets are convinced that U.S. power projection forces will
not be employed directly against them, the level of resis-
tence likely from imaginable Third World targets ranges from
nearly nettling to a guite formidable defense, such as -hat
which an industrialized smaller power like South Africa
might be able to muster.
a. Limitations in Surprise
The deployment of any Soviet intervention force
toward a troublespot seems certain to be detected and likely
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to be reported in the world press. "Strategic" surprize,
then, seems unattainable without the cooperation of the
western intelligence services. But zhe operation includes
the preparation, embarkation, and the transit phases before
the landing takes place. If the United States is to oppose
the operation it will likely happen in one or more of these
phases, and if the landing takes place despite U.S. opposi-
tion (political or military) a degree of strategic surprize
will result from the change in the "s~atus quo" of relative
naval strength discussed above.
The level of tactical surprize possible is guite
considerable. There is always a choice, of beaches and times
and tactics to be made by an amphibious planner, but in the
Soviet case the heavy use of air cushion vehicles, VIOL
aircraft, LASH and RC-RO ships, and even the Soviet amphib-
ious ships themselves will be virtually without precedent.
The Eritish experience in the Falkland Islands war seems
like the most obviously analogous operation to an expected
Soviet ccmtined arms intervention, but comparisons seem
unlikely to be of much use given the different likely mili-
tary goals, tactics, motivation, etc. The world will be
watching the tactics used by the Soviets with the full
expectation that they will represent something new in the
histcry cf amphibious warfare. Likely victems of Soviet
intervention may not include nations or factions with a deep
understanding of the military problems of defense against
amphibious assault, contributing to the tactical surprize
when tie attack takes place.
t. Limitations in Air Cover
Perhaps the most common criticism of Soviet
power projection capability is the lack of tactrical air
cover for the amphibious forces once the borders of the
Soviet Union are more than 200 or so miles behind. The
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United States builds and deploys large aircraft carriers for
this purpose, among others, and is uniquely capable of
bringing very large concentrations of accurate firepower to
bear up to several hundred miles inland from most shorelines
of the world ocean. The Soviets will not have their first
comparable carrier until the last decade of this century.
Their tactics, moreover, as demonstrated in "anti-NATO"
exercises, invariatly support amphibious landings with
tactical air strikes. How then can a large landing be
carried cut in the absence of this capability?
A large landing against concentrated NATO or
ether "first world" forces probably cannot be successfully
attempted ty the Soviets beyend their land-based tactical
air umbrella. But few of the likely Third World interven-
tions contemplated by this analysis would require such
massive airpower. And the deployable airpewer available to
the Soviets in a coihined arms operation seems reasonably
well suited to the worst case that they might encounter.
The worst likely case is a perhaps a landing
against South Africa. This country would almost certainly
fce isolated from western aid in a major confrontation, but
features sophisticated naval, air, and ground forces. The
difficulty lies in their number and sustainability. The
Soviet ships that we have demonstrated to be available for
the protection of the convey have the most advanced defen-
sive missiles and electronics in the world. The attrition
rate of attacking Scuth African aircraft would likely be
very high. The South African Air Force would also probably
te engaged in multiple front battles with neighboring states
at the same time.
Air and naval gunfire support of the landing
force would, as a military problem, consist of the destruc-
tion of artillery, SAM, armor concentrations, and ether
support and command targets further inland. The improvement
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cf the naval guns in the Soviet Navy, in range and ra~e of
fire, effectively moves the area of responsibility of sea-
based air support deeper inland, to the rear area targets.
Air defar.se of the landing zone could be provided at medium
and high altitudes by naval SAMS of ships offshore. At low
altitudes tte SA-9s and ZSU-23-4 weapons organic to the SNI
forces would be effective if beached early, using ACVs for
example, and given adequate early warning of South African
aircraft by the advanced command and control assets of the
fleet offshore. 51
The air support deficiency then, in this diffi-
cult example, is not an insurmountable problem. Given that
the Fcrger aircraft do not tangle one-on-one with enemy
Mirages, sea and land based SAMs provide a significant air
defense against a limited number of even very advanced
fighter-tcmbers. This multiple-layered SAM-based air
defense is completely consistent with Soviet naval air
defense theory, as developed earlier. The problem of
providing air support of the ground forces is partially
ameliorated by the improved naval guns, and the consequent
movement of responsibility for air support inland. Mere
critical, however, is the simple paucity of targets. A
Third World intervention, or even this attack en South
Africa, is not comparable to a landing in northern Germany
or Denmark--there simply won't be as many critical defensive
positions to attack. Those that do exist, especially
bridges, radars, etc., are most vulnerable to attack with
guided weapons, and the Forger is capable of carrying
perhaps two guided air-to-ground weapons [Ref. 35: pp.
238-239]. The number cf Fcrger aircraft (normally 12 per
sl The Soviet fleet dees not at this time have an
airborne early warning system like the American E2-C
aircraft, but could modify helicopters in the way that the




"Kiev" class hull) could be increased by the proven
expediency cf bringing some down to operate off a container
ship, as the British did against the Argentines. Firepower
could be further increased by flying large "Hind D cr E"
type helicopters frcm container ships, or even "Moskva"
class cruisers. These helicopters carry various types of
guided air-to-grcund missiles, rockets, bombs, a gatling
gun, plus a fully-equipped squad of eight infantrymen.
Air defense and air support of the ground troops
are problems, then, but problems cf degree and not prohib-
itive cf intervention en a large scale in a Second or Third
World environment.
c. Limitaticns in Transport
The challenge of demonstrating the transport-
ability of a Soviet interventionary force is a matter first
cf shewing that the lift tonnage exists and would be avail-
able, but more importantly to show that the ships are suit-
able for the task. Can the scenario above be carried out on
the shores of South Africa, or Angola, or Ethiopia, or
Thailand? Certainly the amphibious lift exists to put a
battalion, as in the example, or even as much as a rein-
forced brigade ashore, using naval infantry equipment from
several fleets but dedicated amphibious ships only. For the
measurement of the capability to transport and land the
ground forces that wculd follow to carry out the ultimate
military goal, our modified "select ship" criteria limits us
to these ships capable of putting men ashore at an unim-
proved beach.
Those merchant ships which must support the
landing force while the beach is not yet secured have to be
able to disembark ccmbat vehicles directly into the water,
and a large fraction of the ships considered above can do
that. The RO-ROs feature ramps from which amphibious
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vehicles can be driven into the water, and -he SEEBEE or
LASH ships can do the same or actually operate air cushion
vehicles frcm -hair wells. This sort of capability seems
mere pertinent to augmentation of the SNI lift capability
than the following ground forces, making it possible to lift
SNI forces without decimating local fleer contingency lift
capabilities as was done to the Northern Fleet in Zapad-81
(see above) .
If a single regiment of SNI is deemed adequate
for the task of securing a beachhead, which seems possible
in most of the sorts of situations considered here, then the
merchant fleet can go about offloading the ground forces in
a relatively secure environment, where speed and firepower
are not necessary features of the vehicles carrying out the
transfer. That is, rather than use these merchant snips in
exotic new ways, the barge carriers could use thair barges
and the EO-EOs cr ccrtainerships could unload vehicles and
cargo onto the barges that had been emptied ashore. If the
SNI did their job, command of the air was established, and
the beachhead was secure, then the offload can be done in an
unopposed environment, with the already present combination
of ships and land-based SAMs providing security.
In this environment, several divisions of ground
forces could be put ashore in fairly short order, with no
amphibious training required, and with little more than half
of the available ships of the appropriate types used to
support the task. This figure is conservative. Gorshkov's
quote at the end of the previous chapter, indicated that a
brigade, which is half the size of a division, can be
carried ty a "Tulius Fuchik" class ship. Each of these two
ships "... can offload up to 25,000 tons of cargo in 13
hours without the need for piers." [Hef. 23: p. 4 16] When
the Aleksey Kosygin and the nuclear powered LASH ship, both
of which are of similar size, come on line they will
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represent roughly two divisions (about 100,000 tons) of
cargo capacity all by themselves. The Ro-RO ships -chat have
come on lire since 1975 alone represent another 600,000
deadweight tons of capacity [Ref. 24: pp. 545-547]. Of
course a well-planned loadout that matches types and densi-
ties of cargo to -the specific capaoilities of the ships
could achieve an even better efficiency. For example, the
SEEBEE barges each fit eight T-72 tanks line abreast very
nicely. Yulius Fuchik or her sister could, with 26 of
these, carry 208 tanks or other vehicles while the remaining
ships carry lighter, more easily containerized cargo.
Finally, any combat contribution of the airborne
forces cculd and would be supported by Soviet Air Forces 1
Military Transport Aviation (VTA) operating out of staging
bases in previously secured areas, such as Luanda, or
Conakry, or Danang. The maximum range of the 11-76 Candid
aircraft at maximum payload is 6,300 kilometers, which indi-
cates that the radius of action is adequate to operate from
such staging areas to any coastal area of Africa or Asia
[Ref. 36: p. 7]. Paratroopers could be evacuated by the
amphibious forces after the beachhead was secured, or by VTA
aircraft once an airfield was captured or built.
d. Limitations in Command and Control
Soviet capabilities for worldwide naval command
and control have improved very dramatically in the past
twenty years. The exercises called "Okean" in 1970 and 1975
were the first demcnstrations of sophisticated exercises
worldwide under the central direction of the naval staff in
Moscow. Since then, as pointed out earlier, the "Kirov,"
"Slava," and "Ivan Rcgov" classes have joined the increasing
numbers cf "Kiev," "Moskva," and "Sverdlov" combatants with
very sophisticated command and control equipment. Certain
naval auxiliaries are also used as flagships. Given an
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environment of non-interference with communications, which
seems fair in most of these Third World interventions, there
seems to be little dcubt that Moscow could maintain a satis-





The goal of this thesis has been to provide some insight
into the factors that drive the decisionmaking process when
the Soviets are faced with a situation in which direct
intervention in a local war is an option. The possibility
is cften dismissed because there is no history of such
direct Scviet military intervention. There is also, perhaps
as a consequence, a widely held conventional wisdom that no
such mission exists. This analysis pursued the ephemeral
basis cf that conventional wisdom, both in history and in
material capability, and found that a significant and
growing possibility of a decision to intervene with Scviet
forces exists.
The analytical method was to create an historically-
based dynamic context for understanding the way that Scviet
decisions are made given an observable level of relative
costs and benefits in three categories. Working out the
cost-benefit (or risk-gain) factors in the political/
ideological, economic, and military categories led to an
overview of the ways in which some of these factors have
actually come into play over a range of incidents involving
Soviet naval response to world crises. Five general trends
emerged:
1. U.S. naval forces usually precede Soviet forces to an
area of contention.
2. The Soviets have been willing to risk attacks upon
their ships and men if the attacker is a pariah and
the ally important enough strategically.
3. Innovative tactics have appeared in low-risk situ-
ations and are adopted if proven.
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4. Large proportions of the ships in a fleet have
deployed when the threat (U.S. ships) has also moved
away from that home fleet area.
5. Soviet overseas acquisitions have been used aggres-
sively to increase projection capability.
These trends were then placed in the larger context of
the stakes that Soviet decisionmakers see from the ideolo-
gical, economic, and military points of view. The ideolo-
gical stakes were ultimately seen to be a tool for the
justification of action during the coincidence of historic
opportunity and strategic necessity. The second and fifth
trends atove seemed to find their ideological dimension in
the fatalistic Soviet acceptance of high risk when the
necessity to support Nasser, for example, was absolute,
because of the importance of naval and air facilities.
Ideology provides a language of commitment for the Soviet
Onion which may not provide a literal clue to their motiva-
tions or perceptions but must be acknowledged for what it
is. The economic stakes were on two levels. There was
first a positive incentive to intervene when the likelihood
of creating a market for arms was significant. Secondly,
there was clearly a willingness to enter into a situation
with a large negative cash flow in areas where the likeli-
hood of air or naval access was high. The use of these
facilities to threaten western trade in an apocalyptic situ-
ation has economic dimensions but for our purposes the
simple capabilities to forward-deploy and get there first
(trend #1) or even already be there (trend #5) seem more
pertinent.
The nilitary stakes were seen to be the dominant consi-
derations in Soviet decisions to intervene in local wars,
contributing to each of the five trends above. Each of the
19 cases in the historical database was considered in terms
of military risks and benefits and a new set of trends was
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developed describing the values at stake and the nature of
the symtclic "language" of military activity in a crisis.
Several new concepts emerged:
1. The communication of Soviet perceptions of "strategic
necessity" to potential adversaries (especially the
U.S.) .
2. The importance of having adequate weaponry for the
predictable completion of a military task.
3. Constant positive control of military assets.
4. Maintaining appropriate and consistent levels of
commitment.
5. The credible threat of a military response propor-
tional to the level of strategic necessity communi-
cated.
These points, as well as the five earlier trends, were then
illustrated in a series of case studies that demonstrated
the way these values are ccmmunicat ed in the course of a
dynamic naval confrontation
.
It was seen that there are patterns of Soviet behavior
in Third Wcrld crises that can be traced to their motiva-
tions and which can be projected when the sense of the
Soviet capability to act is accurate. Military capability
was seen as the defining parameter, the quantity that deter-
mined the answers that the Soviet decisionmakers would reach
when they considered whether they should, on their own
terms, act credibly and profitably to influence the cutccme
of a crisis. Capabilities defined the limits of Soviet
intentions to act in a given situation.
Finally, the military capabilities pertinent to these
Soviet considerations were developed in considerable detail.
The ships themselves were described and the military tools
actually available when the assets were aggregated at
several likely levels of intervention were considered. Seme
conventional wisdom was challenged and where head counting
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was appropriate to test common knowledge it was done. It
was seen that with nc more imagination than they have exhi-
bited in past exercises and crises it was possible tc
describe viable Soviet interventional^ forces at three
likely levels, with known technology and proven tactics.
The limits of Soviet intervention can thus be defined.
In a given situation they are described by the capability of
Soviet military force to act in an appropriate and propor-
tional way with reserve capability to see various escalation
contingencies through to acceptable conclusions. This
powerful and versitile level of force is coming to be avail-
able for the Soviet Onion. Against the United States naval
task groups that have historically preempted their involve-
ment and against the likely range of Third World targets,
the Soviet fleet is increasingly capable of presenting a
legitimate threat. An aggressive military posture has
proven itself to be directly effective for the task at hand,
and indirectly valuable by contributing to the strength and
types of military influence to be applied in the future.
Thus the rational factors contributing to the Soviet deci-
sion seem tc indicate a strong possibility of greater direct
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